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NOTE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE
HEALTHCARE INFORMATION
TRUST
Paul T. Kostyackt
INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION HAS BEEN SAID TO BE the currency
of the modem technological age. 'Our economy is not simply
supplied by information, it is fueled by information." Today,
information has become a secondary product of -almost all
transactions.2 In fact, massive markets for secondary informa-
tion are developing.
Today a company exists that gathers, consolidates, sorts,
and reports information about nearly everyone in the country.
3
Acxiom Corporation has information concerning over 196 mil-
lion Americans.4 The organization synthesizes information from
a variety of sources including credit card transactions, real es-
1 The author is graduate of Case Western Reserve University Law School. He
is currently an Associate in the Cleveland office of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. He
would like to thank professor Maxwell Mehlman for his assistance in writing this
note. Loving dedication of the note to Stephanie Kostyack for putting up with him
while it was written. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which he is associated.
1 Robert O'Harrow Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal, WASH. PosT, Mar.
8, 1998 at Al (quoting D. Van Skilling, CEO of Experian, a data-clearinghouse/credit
reporting industry giant).
2 See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Eco-
nomic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEo. L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996) (discussing the informa-
tion that is routinely disclosed in voluntary commercial transactions).
3 See Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: Privacy Devalued in Information Econ-
omy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1997, at Al.4 0'Harrow Jr., supra note 1.
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tate records, 5 and 800-number telephone calls6 for resale to cor-
porations seeking to market to targeted demographics of con-
sumers. The company's sales clearly demonstrate the growing
financial relevance of the market in "secondary data"; 7 Acx-
iom's revenues have increased a staggering amount in seven
years from $91 million in 19928 to nearly $730 million in 1999. 9
Market observers suggest that enterprises will spend over $10
billion dollars in 2000 in building and maintaining "data ware-
houses" of secondary information. 10
The health care market is not without analogous, though
more limited, initiatives. As an example, the Medical Informa-
tion Bureau (ME) has long compiled information on individu-
als for risk assessment and fraud avoidance by the insurance
industry. As this Note will discuss, hospitals, health systems,
and managed care health plans are becoming the central players
to utilize the medical information collected on consumers in the
growing secondary information market and to increase the value
of health care data as a critical strategic resource. I x
Health care, however, is an industry holding uniquely
sensitive personal information, and its evolution may chart a
different course than the secondary information markets evolving
in other industries due to recently finalized federal health care
information privacy rules.' 2 Privacy advocates, due to the strong
S5d.
6 See Robert O'Harrow Jr., A Hidden Toll on Free Calls: Lost Privacy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at Al (discussing the lack of prohibitions on the collection of
telephone information).
7 "Secondary data" in "secondary data markets" is, for the purposes of this
Note, information collected at a primary consumer transaction (e.g., a doctor visit),
which might be used for a purpose not relating to the primary consumer transaction
(e.g., marketing pharmaceutical products).
8 See AcxIoM, INC., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT.
9 See ACXIOM, INc., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 29, available at http://www.acx-
iom.com/subimages/20042001AnRpt-99-FULL.pdf.
1o O'Harrow Jr., supra note 1.
" See Mariella Savidge, Who's Selling Your Medical Information, THE MORN-
ING CALL (ALLENTOWN), Nov. 7, 1999, at D1 (discussing how the Medical Informa-
tion Bureau Inc. collects medical information and sells it to insurance companies);
Ray Reed, Organization Compiles Medical Info, ROANOKE TiMEs, Jun. 9, 1998, at C1
(same); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health
Care Information, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1997) (noting that "[tihe practice of medi-
cine increasingly depends on the large-scale comparison and analysis of personal
medical information. As a result, health care institutions view personal medical in-
formation as a critical strategic resource").
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countervailing value of medical information confidentiality,
have convinced the federal government to adopt a form of "de-
fault privacy rules" 13 whereby explicit written "authorizations"
will be required for health care providers, health plans, and data
clearinghouses to use gathered medical information from health
care purchasers for purposes other than care provision, claims
payment, regulatory reporting, and research. 14 These regulatory
initiatives will frustrate the emergence of a fully dynamic sec-
ondary market in medical information. They might, however,
provide individuals with the ability to benefit from value inher-
ent in the use of secondary health care data through a new or-
ganization, the Healthcare Information Trust.
This Note presents the concept of the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust and the reasons why it may be a preferable alternative
to other organizations in managing secondary health care infor-
mation. The Healthcare Information Trust is an organization
with the fiduciary obligation to manage an individual's secon-
dary health care information for the advantage of the individual
as beneficiary. The Healthcare Information Trust may be the
only organization that could maximize the value of secondary
health care information to the individual and to a developing
secondary health care information market.
This Note is divided into four parts. The first three parts lay
the practical and legal groundwork for the emergence of the
Healthcare Information Trust. In part one, the emergence of "in-
tegrated delivery systems" and "managed care organizations" as
the developing focal points of health care information consoli-
dation is discussed. The second part presents a simplified
framework useful in understanding the nature of the threats and
12 See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
45 C.F.R. § 164 (2000).
13 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 54-58 (discussing theoretical distinction
between default and mandatory rules for information disclosure or privacy); see also
Murphy, supra note 2, at 2383 (posing "the fundamental question [as] whether a rule
permitting subsequent disclosure is superior, as a default rule, to a rule requiring
privacy"); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 521-26 (1995) (discussing concept of individual default ownership and control
of the full longitudinal medical record used for any secondary purpose with non-
informed consent use exceptions only in limited instances by health information
"trustees").
14 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (regulating authorization for use of health infor-
mation for secondary purposes by a covered entity).
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opportunities inherent in the secondary use of health care in-
formation. This section also explores the economics of health
care information, raising the possible implications of "default
privacy rules" on the emergence of a dynamic "secondary
health care information" market. The third part discusses the
agency and market barriers to individual managed care organi-
zations or integrated delivery systems, or their collaborative in-
dustry groups, emerging as the organizers of an individual's
"longitudinal medical record." Finally, part four describes the
conception of the Healthcare Information Trust as the organizer
of the "longitudinal medical record," its promises and the major
barriers to its possible creation.
PART I: TECHNOLOGY, MCOs, AND IDSs
The health care industry is, arguably, on the cusp of
technological capacity to realize the Healthcare Information
Trust envisioned in this Note. Wide-scale consolidation and
integration of information is occurring in the health care
industry; these advances are occurring prominently in evolving
"integrated delivery systems" and "managed care
organizations. 15 These efforts, coupled with the increasing
consolidation of the integrated delivery systems and managed
care organizations within individual health care markets, may
become viable primary sources of regional health care data
repositories.
16
Further, the Internet has become a ubiquitous technology
that will emerge as the vehicle for disseminating the "longitudi-
nal medical records" 17 providing new value to patients and pro-
1S This Note uses a number of acronyms for health care terms. A definition of
"integrated delivery systems" or "IDSs" as used in this Note can be found, infra, at
Part I.A. A definition of "managed care organizations" or "MCOs" as used in this
Note can be found, infra, at Part I.A.
16 A definition and discussion of "clinical data repositories" or "CDRs" and
related "data warehouses" or "warehouses" begins, infra, at Part I.B.
17 A longitudinal medical record is the health care record of an individual
containing all medical and transactional data concerning an individual across all epi-
sodes of care and across all health care providers, insurers or administrators, govern-
mental agencies or other individuals or entities maintaining health care information
identifiable to the individual concerned. At present, of course, such a concept is theo-
retical, or an aspiration, since no such wide-scale comprehensive record system exists
today. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 458 (calling it a "patient-based longitudinal
health record"); see also INST. OF MED., NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIENCES, HEALTH DATA IN
THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DIscLOSURE, AND PRIVACY 5 (1994) (discussing com-
prehensiveness and inclusiveness of databases); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (de-
scribing 'longitudinal oriented lifetime patient summaries').
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viders. In other words, the Internet will soon become the back-
bone of longitudinal medical records, at least initially in read-
only form, for individuals, providers and other health care in-
formation users. It will do this by providing a vehicle for mak-
ing consolidated information available to anyone with an Inter-
net connection, a standard browser application, and the proper
security.
This section presents an overview of integrated delivery
systems and managed care organizations as the primary organ-
izers of health care data and a simplified discussion of the cur-
rent structure and use of technology in the health care industry
that facilitate the development of the Healthcare Information
Trust.
A. Emergence of IDSs and MCOs
In 1994 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a study
presenting observations and recommendations about "health
database organizations" (HDOs). 18 HDOs referred to a variety
of entities having access to or control of aggregate and indi-
vidually identifiable medical data to be used for public release
and public analysis.1 9 At that time, the IOM recognized that true
HDOs did not exist, although they would be emerging in the
near future.20 The IOM further recognized that HDOs would not
be organizers of "primary medical records," nor were they "in-
tended to be the major source of information about specific pa-
tients for the treating physician," but would be compilations of
data for "secondary" uses.21
The IOM report also discussed at length the potential prob-
lems with HDOs, including making recommendations for their
structure and regulation. 22 The report left much unsaid, how-
ever, about how widespread HDOs would become, their rela-
tionship to the primary consolidators of health care records, and
particularly, the barriers to realizing truly "comprehensive" and
18 See INST. OF MED., supra note 17.
19 Id. at3.
20 id.
21 Id. at 5; see also, Gostin, supra note 13, at 486 (providing a workable defi-
nition for "secondary" health care data uses).22 See INST. OF MED., supra note 17, at 1-26 (providing an executive summary
of HDO issues and recommendations).
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"inclusive" data sets across individuals and populations. 23 Cit-
ing specialized efforts to create HDOs with varying degrees of
"comprehensive" and "inclusive" data sets, 24 the report assumed
that significant HDOs would emerge in the future.
The IOM's concerns and recommendations pertaining to
HDOs are well founded and are very real considerations today.
This Note, however, questions whether truly "comprehensive"
and "inclusive" HDOs will emerge for the benefit of the public.
Further, as will be discussed in Part III, this Note questions
whether the existing organizations emerging as the focal collec-
tors of health care data would be capable, absent some external
regulatory or market pressure, of divulging their information or
creating meaningful analysis for public consumption.
Today, most health care information is still held in "islands
of data" throughout the extremely loose federation of health
care providers and insurers; detailed medical information still
primarily resides with individual providers (e.g., physician of-
fices, laboratories, hospitals, pharmacies), employers, and
health plans. 25 One need only observe first, the number of indi-
23 See id. at 40-90 (lacking in-depth discussion of how HDOs will emerge and
resistance to sharing data by provider and insurance organizations that might be pri-
mary collectors). "Comprehensiveness" means the data collected for individuals
across different provider locations, and over time across episodes of care. Id. at 5.
"Inclusiveness" means data collected across a variety of populations of individuals
and across geographies). Id.
24 See id. at 56-60 (citing a variety of developing HDOs in 1994).
25 Gostin reports that:
The General Accounting Office estimates that the 34 million annual hospi-
tal admissions and 1.2 billion physician visits could generate the equivalent
of 10 billion pages of medical records.... Information about a single epi-
sode of care could reside in the records of several different providers ....
Further, there are no systematic operational models for the electronic stor-
age of all aspects of health records.
Gostin, supra note 13, at 457 (citations omitted); see also William M. Sage, Regulat-
ing Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 1701, 1723 (discussing the difficulties of compiling data from individual
providers, the author notes that the "universe of potentially regulated parties below
the level of the health plan is daunting"); RICHARD BRETAGNE ET AL., LEADING THE
WAY TO HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN THE ELECTRONIC WORLD (1999),
http:llwww.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9fd
/ (noting that "each individual has dozens of contacts with the health care system
through various employers, many episodes of care, and multiple health plans, result-
ing in point-of-service 'islands' of patient information"); Lisa L. Dahm, Using the
DNA Profile as the Unique Patient Identifier in the Community Health Information
Network. Legal Implications, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 227, 230
[Vol. 12:393
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vidual physicians and health systems, and second, their largely
insular relationships to understand the magnitude of the chal-
lenge.2
6
Nonetheless, several market trends point to the emergence
of larger "islands of information." These include the consolida-
tion of hospitals and other providers into "integrated delivery
systems," (IDSs) and the emergence of "managed care organiza-
tions," (MCOs). Both of these organizations are collecting and
consolidating far greater amounts of computerized medical in-
formation than ever before. These entities, arguably, emerge as
the primary source and initial organizers of digitalized health
information.
The 1990s have witnessed the rapid horizontal and vertical
consolidation of hospitals, physicians, and other ancillary pro-
viders (e.g., skilled nursing homes, nursing homes, home health
agencies, durable medical equipment providers) into IDSs.27
Component parts of an IDS financially and legally incorporated,
and integrated into one health system enterprise, may be far
looser confederations of networks, or may be a combination.2
8
Due to the variety of structures that these entities assume, con-
ventional wisdom observes that if you have seen one IDS, then
you have seen one IDS.29 Nonetheless, these entities are similar
(1997) (noting that health care providers encounter information that is only partially
or totally inaccessible due to disparate information systems).
6 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1723 (noting that the Joint Commission for
Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO) accredits 18,000 hospitals nation-
ally, and there are over 500,000 physicians currently practicing in the United States);
Dean C. Coddington et al., Providing Capital for Physician Group Practices: New
Opportunities for Hospitals, HEALTHcARE FIN. MGMT., Dec. 1999, at 44 (noting that
"of the more than 500,000 physicians in private practice in the United States, 75 per-
cent are in solo practices or [small] single-specialty groups").
27 See Edwin Fonner, Jr., Milestones For Developing Integrated Delivery
Systems, J. OF HEALTH CARE FIN., Fall 1996, at 1 (discussing horizontal consolidation
of hospitals, emergence of for-profit hospital systems, and physician group practice
growth and the resulting development of vertically integrated IDSs); Robert Jantzen
& Patricia R. Loubeau, Risk-Sharing Integration Efforts in the Hospital Sector,
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Mar. 22, 1999, at 83 (discussing the IDS as the "emerg-
ing organizational model" of healthcare delivery).28 See Martin P. Charns, Organization Design of Integrated Delivery Systems,
42 HosP. & HEALTH SERv. -ADMIN. 411, 411 (1997) (discussing the theoretical
evolution of IDSs through stages of horizontal and vertical integration).
29 See Integration Strategies in Transition: An Interview with Russell C.
Coile, Jr., HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2000, at 37 [hereinafter Integration
Strategies] (quoting industry expert recognizing that "the implicit concept of the IDS
2002]
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in that they are all forging greater financial, operational, and
clinical linkages among the disparate providers of health care in
the face of the growth of managed care and increasingly
competitive markets.
30
Medical information sharing is essential to the provision of
clinical care and administering a complex health care system.
3
'
IDSs have recognized the need for, and have begun to invest
substantial capital in, integrating information systems to pro-
vide, at least theoretically, a seamless delivery of care-access
to medical and health care administration information for pro-
viders throughout the IDS.32
MCOs also emerged as the second market player effec-
tively consolidating vast amounts of individually identifiable
health care information. An MCO, for the purposes of this Note,
is a prepaid health care delivery organization that provides
managed care insurance products, which can take a variety of
forms. These organizations and products would include HMOs,
preferred provider organizations, exclusive provider organiza-
tions, point-of-service plans, and physician-sponsored organiza-33
tions. This definition would include entities such as all models
of HMOs, Blue-Cross/Blue-Shield plans now utilizing managed
care insurance products, and other insurers, self-funded em-
ployers, and provider-organized networks insofar as they utilize
(or subcontract for) managed care functionality and offer insur-
ance products directly or through other organizations.
will continue, but we probably will refer to them simply as systems with a small s
because they will have such a variety of structures").30 See, e.g., Jantzen & Loubeau , supra note 27, at 84 (finding that the major
factors driving greater alignment among providers has been the growth of managed
care and intensity of local competition).
31 See Gostin, supra note 13, at 453.
32 See Thomas M. McNamara, Health Information Networks: Enabling Care
Management in IDSs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 2000, at 30 (discussing the
necessity of IDSs to integrate information systems to share managed care, cost and
clinical information); Gwen Mousin et al., IT Integration Options for Integrated De-
livery Systems, HEALTHCARE FiN. MGMT., Feb., 1999, at 53 (discussing the substan-
tial capital investment required in integration, although challenging the certainty of
"cost savings" through integration).
33 For a more detailed description of these types of products/organizations,
see Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the Crossroads:
Can Managed Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 25, 27-29 (1998).
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Although MCOs have a long history in the United States,
beginning with Kaiser Permanente plans in the 1930s,34 it has
not been until the last three decades that they have emerged in
greater numbers and permutations.35 By the 1990s, however,
through growth and rapid market consolidation, they and their
insurance products have become ubiquitous and formidable
shapers of the competitive dynamic of the entire health care in-
dustry. 6
Like IDSs, MCOs have realized the need for substantial in-
formation in order to manage the care of individuals and popu-
lations.3 7 Many MCOs have expanded their data system capa-
bilities beyond the basic claims processing functionality of in-
demnity insurers.3 8 Substantial numbers of MCOs track and re-
port data concerning cost and utilization, member satisfaction,
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Sets (HEDIS) (or
other care-quality report cards), specific disease incidence,
population health, mortality rates, and health changes by condi-
tion. 9 MCOs also track data to support important clinical and
administrative functionality, such as capitation rate analysis,
provider credentialing, physician profiling, diagnostic episode
analysis, and illness severity adjustments.4 ° Critically important
34 For information about the history of Kaiser Permanente, see KAISER PER-
MANENTE, HISTORY: MORE THAN 50 YEARS OF QuALrrY, at http://www.kaiserper-
manente.org/newsroom/history.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2000).
35 For information on the growth of HMOs from the 1970s to the mid-1990s,
see INTERSTuDY, THE INTERSTuDY HMO TREND REPORT, 1978-1997 (1998); Brown
& Hartung, supra note 33, at 26-27.
36 See Grant T. Savage et al., Beyond Managed Costs, HEALTH CARE MGMT.
REV., Winter 2000, at 93 (finding that although MCOs face an uncertain future if they
continue to merely manage costs today, they will "dominate the national market for
employer-based health care" through rapid consolidation, increasing market share of
specific MCOs).
37 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1726 (discussing the role of MCOs in consoli-
dating provider data and the benefits and limitations of using MCOs for information
disclosure); see also Arnold M. Epstein, Rolling Down the Runway: The Challenges
Ahead for Quality Report Cards, 279 JAMA 1691, 1694-95 (1998) (discussing how
increased information to consumers will help develop quality indicators).
38 See Douglas R. Wholey et al., The Diffusion of Information Technology
Among Health Maintenance Organizations, 25 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv., Spring
2000, at 24 (reporting results of the information technology capabilities of 588
HMOs).
39 See id. at 29. For a description of HEDIS, see NAT'S CoMM. FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, THE HEALTH PLAN EMPLoYER DATA AND INFORMATION SET (HEDIS),
http://www.ncqa.org/Pages/Programs/HEDIS/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2000).
40 Wholey et al., supra note 38, at 26.
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for the purposes of this Note, a large percentage of MCOs,
sixty-eight percent, utilize or are creating "data warehouses"
supporting managerial and clinical decision-support systems.41
B. Creation of Clinical Data Repositories and Data Warehouses
Perhaps the most promising efforts by IDSs and MCOs to-
day to organize and use the disparate pockets of information in
their delivery system is the creation of clinical data repositories
(CDRs) and data warehouses. CDRs and data warehouses inte-
grate "numerous 'islands of information' . . . to allow users ac-
cess [to enterprise-wide information] in a timely, effective
manner... even if the [existing hospital's] operational systems
are not standardized onto one [information system] platform or
one physical device."42 A CDR is typically oriented toward "pa-
tient-centered information" which can be updated in a real-time
environment and organized so as to allow multiple access points
and quick retrieval of information to support treatment deci-
sions.43 A CDR will contain individually identifiable health care
data containing "patient demographics, lab results, scheduling
information, medical record data, and images such as x-rays."
The amount invested in clinical data repositories by health care
providers has been substantial.45
Data warehouses are also being developed by IDSs as well
as MCOs. 46 Data warehouses may also contain individually
identifiable health care information, though they are primarily
oriented toward "aggregate views of the clinical, operational,
and financial performance of the enterprise," in order to sup-
port, in a timely manner, reports supporting "administrative,
managerial and executive decision-making." 47 Although less
41 id.
42 STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATION: THEORY
INTO PRACTICE 16 (Marion J. Ball et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter STRATEGIES AND
TECHNOLOGIES].
43 See id.
44Id.
45 See John Morrissey, Integration Sacrificed For Y2K Preparation, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 3, 1999, at 34. ("Sales of clinical repository systems surpassed $1
billion for the first time in 1998, 43% more than sales in 1997 and 140% more than
the $459 million recorded for 1996.... In 1998, for example, the projection of $631
million in sales was eclipsed by actual sales of $1.1 billion. And in 1997, a projected
volume of $541 million was outpaced by the actual total of $773 million.").
46 See STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 42, at 24-31.
47 Id. at 17.
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focused on individual patient or MCO enrollee data, these sys-
tems can support decisionmaking for population-oriented activi-
ties. MCOs have been able to use these data warehouses to fa-
cilitate management and clinical decision support and to more
efficiently and accurately produce mandated reports for gov-
ernmental agencies, employers, the National Committee for
Quality Assurance (NCQA), and others, such as HEDIS.48
C. The Internet Revolution and Individual Access to Medical
Records
Not only are CDRs and data warehouses emerging in
MCOs and IDSs as consolidators of health care information, but
rapid developments in computer networking are also occurring.
Internet access is quickly becoming a ubiquitous feature in most
industries, and is becoming available to wider segments of the
individual population. 49 This development has important impli-
cations for the sharing of digitalized medical records not only
within IDSs, but with patients and other users of medical re-
cords. The eagerness of Americans to use the Internet for medi-
cal information is well documented.50
The standardization of Internet and browser technology can
dramatically reduce the costs and difficulties of patients, and
their health care agents, to access health care information about
them.5' If the Internet is used as a vehicle to disseminate certain
information, as will be discussed below, it eliminates the costs
of installing and maintaining remote software applications,
which are specific to the software applications used by the
48 See id.; see also Wholey et al., supra note 38, at 28-29 (discussing services
provided by information technology). Information about NCQA can be found at
http://www.ncqa.org/index.htm.
49 About 44.4 million households will be online by the end of 2000, up from
12.7 million in 1995, an increase of nearly 250 percent over five years; roughly 55
million Americans log onto the Internet on a typical day to send or read e-mail, get
news and information or conduct business; and industry experts estimate that traffic
on the Internet doubles every 100 days. Richard Drezen, A Dot-Corn World, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2000, at G1; see also Jill Young Miller, The Web Grows Up, AT-
LANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 14, 2000, at DI (finding a dramatic increase in use of the
Internet by women).
50 Ninety-eight million Americans use the Internet each year to look for health
information, which is up 44 million in the last two years. Edie Kasten, Let the Surfer
Beware: Use Health Information Found on Internet Wisely, CHCAGO TRIB., Nov. 5,
2000, at C8 (citing an August 2000 Harris Poll).
51 See STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 42, at 32.
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holder of the health care data.52 Further, the use of an Internet
browser to access health care information requires no additional
training and expertise-that is, the training and expertise re-
quired to visit a web site such as "Yahoo" would translate to the
ability to review medical records.53 Finally, as demonstrated by
the example below, software can be developed to access, inte-
grate, and present information already stored in CDRs and data
warehouses. Similar software can be integrated into an existing
information infrastructure, minimizing additional data integra-
tion and compilation requirements.54
This technology is already being used successfully by
IDSs. The University of Virginia's early experimentation with
the Internet in its Virtual Electronic Medical Record (VEMR)
system is good example.55 The University of Virginia used what
it calls a Medical Records Generator (MRG) to organize various
sources of information throughout its health care enterprise, cre-
ating a multi-layered, though non-dynamic, hyper-text markup
language record of individual patient information including in-
patient/outpatient financial account status, laboratory results,
patient scheduling, patient demographics, radiological images,
inpatient medications, insurance coverage, and discharge sum-
maries.56 Some of the information was compiled through a
document management system that scanned documents in order
to allow the end-user access to imaged information ranging
from x-rays to a copy of the patient's insurance card.57 How-
ever, most of the information was complied from existing health
care information systems.
The University of Virginia experience is demonstrative of
the existing capability of the Internet to revolutionize informa-
tion access to medical record data. Although the information in
the University of Virginia's VEMR was non-dynamic, read-
only records, web technology is quickly becoming integrated
into commercial information system products,59 which will al-
low, in the near future, the ability to update information through
52 See id. at 24.
51 See id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
55 See id. at 37.
56 see id.
-7 See id. at 36-37.
51 See id. at 40.
59 See id.
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a browser. Finally, the University of Virginia VEMR project
cost the enterprise $1.7 million over five years starting in
1993.60 Although the authors caution that different organiza-
tions will have different financial requirements,61 this level of
capitalization would not be an insurmountable barrier to many
larger health care organizations. Moreover, it is a cost that may
decrease in the future, given the greater incorporation of Inter-
net features in primary health care information system products
today, including tools which access CDRs and data ware-
houses 62
The VEMR experience demonstrates that the use of the
Internet can make information available to anyone with appro-
priate clearance, an Internet connection, and the ability to re-
view medical information. In this respect, it is revolutionary, as
it decreases the transaction costs to such a degree that anyone,
including individuals and providers, can access and use digital-
ized medical records.
This section has demonstrated two of the three elements
necessary for the emergence of a Healthcare Information Trust.
First, the consolidation of greater islands of digitalized data in
CDRs and data warehouses occurring today in IDSs and MCOs
provides a starting, primary record source for comprehensive
digitalized medical records-at least for records within individ-
ual IDSs and MCOs. Second, the Internet provides a feasible
information network in order to practically and economically
share digitized medical records from individual to consumers,
their providers, and other third parties. The next section de-
scribes the emergence of a third requirement-the creation of a
market for individually identifiable health care data where the
individual is more than a passive participant.
PART I[: LAW-ECONOMIC PROSPECTIVE ON
HEALTHCARE DATA AND PRIVACY
To understand the role of the hypothetical Healthcare In-
formation Trust, it is critical to understand the economics of
medical health care information within the ongoing medical re-
6 See id.
61 See id. The current VEMR system allows users the ability to view medical
record information. At this time, however, it does not allow the user to use the Inter-
net browser to update information. In this sense, it is "non-dynamic" and "read-
only." 62 See id. at 21-23.
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cords privacy debate. First, a theoretical framework for using
individually identifiable health care information for both "inclu-
sionary" and "exclusionary" purposes will be set forth. Second,
the economics of voluntarily divulged information will be de-
scribed. Third, an observation of how this model has been ap-
plied to justify the creation of "default privacy rules" in health
care information will be presented. This discussion will provide
an understanding of the impact that the current proposed Stan-
dards for Privacy may have on medical information contained
in IDSs and MCOs; further, it will lay the basis for understand-
ing why the existing health care market fails to provide an effi-
cient secondary market for health care information that provides
both individual and collective benefit.
A. Inclusionary/Exclusionary Framework
In discussing data collected about individuals, it is useful to
distinguish between "primary healthcare data" use and "secon-
dary healthcare data" use. This Note addresses the latter of the
two. In Gostin's framework, "primary healthcare data" is used
directly for the medical care of the individual, patient manage-
ment, and financial reimbursement. 63 This is the direct use of
information provided by the patient, and created by the health
care provider, during the episode of care. Its use directly in the
provision of and payment of care is, arguably, 64 implied in the
contractual relationship between the patient and health care pro-
vider.65
63 Gostin, supra note 13, at 486 (describing "primary justification" uses and
"secondary uses").
64 See id. at 486-87 (arguing against blanket assumptions about data disclo-
sure without consent and need for compelling justification for non-consent releases).
65 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2387, 2402 (recognizing that information in
commercial transactions is property and the right to the information "is a question of
contract, either explicit contract, or... implied contract"). Murphy also recognizes
that the analogous implied privacy standard between attorney-client and physician-
patient, although ethical in origin, is "at bottom... a rule of contract." Id. at 2408-10;
see also Sage, supra note 25, at 1746-52 (discussing agency-related disclosure obli-
gations"); Gostin, supra note 13, at 508-09 (recognizing that an action for misuse of
patient information by a physician can be based upon, among other theories, that of
implied contract). A Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) drafting committee is dis-
cussing a revision of the Code to include implied warranties in information exchange.
Resembling the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose existing in con-
tracts for sale of tangible goods, the UCC may establish a national standard for in-
formation exchange. Kristin B. Keltner, Networked Health Information: Assuring
Quality Control on the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 417, 435-36 (1998).
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"Secondary healthcare data" is the use of primary health-
care data for numerous ancillary purposes including, but not
limited to, disclosures for education, regulatory purposes, com-
mercial uses, research, and public health.66 The comprehensive
information enclosed in secondary healthcare data is very simi-
lar to that contained in what some would term "longitudinal
medical records." 67 This would encompass every record about a
person's health and care provision over all providers, all times,
places, insurance coverage, or care delivery organizations.
68
The promise of secondary uses of "semi-public" 69 digitized
medical records, however, is not without serious threat to indi-
viduals. This is primarily through the potential for secondary
uses of data to the detriment of individuals. Many authors have
forcefully cautioned about the palpable effects on the individual
of the digitalization and the inclusion of medical records within
health care organizations, governmental agencies, and within
any form of broader national electronic health care information
infrastructure. 70 The wide-scale digitalization, consolidation,
sharing, and data-linkages not only exacerbate existing threats
to individuals, but raises a wealth of new issues pertaining to
appropriate use of information. Gostin and Schwartz note that
these fears are real, given the lack of virtually any federal re-
straints on secondary uses of the vast majority of individually
identifiable medical information, 71 the ad-hoc nature of state
legislation,72 and the limited scope and constraining power of
66 Gostin outlines a number of uses for information tracked in currently exist-
ing "population-wide health databases," including uses considered in this Note as
"secondary healthcare data." Gostin, supra note 13, at 467
67 See id. at 458 (calling it "patient-based longitudinal health records"); see
also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (describing 'longitudinal oriented lifetime patient
summaries').
6 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 52 (describing how with the use of online
record management, one click of a mouse button can allow physicians to view a pa-
tient's comprehensive medical record).
69 See id. (describing the semi-public nature of on-line medical records).
70 See generally Gostin, supra note 13 (providing, arguably, one of the most
authoritative discussions of medical record privacy risks).
71 See id. at 494-506 (1995); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 46 (explaining how
the United States lacks any regulation prohibiting certain uses of health care informa-
tion); see also Sheri Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy,
and Health Care Reform, HASTINGS CR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 13, 13 (noting
commonly cited fact that video rentals have greater federal protection than do medi-
cal records).
72 Gostin, supra note 13, at 506-08 (discussing state privacy legislation, in-*
cluding the "patient-provider privilege" and "disease-specific" statutes).
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common law remedies for breaches of confidentiality (or other,
similar tort actions), particularly after data is shared by the ini-
tial care provider for what may be, initially, legitimate pur-
poses. 7
3
The use of personally identifiable data as a market com-
modity has a nexus with the propensity of organizations to
minimize uncertainty.74 That is, absent economic, regulatory,
liability, or contractual restraints, organizations will "greedily.
scan and store as much information as possible" in order to
identify and, if possible, eliminate risk.75 The stakes are high;
effective use of information, particularly in markets such as in-
surance, can mean profit-sharer returns or insolvency. 76 Infor-
mation that can better identify "most-profitable" customers may
be used to target those consumers, providing a significant com-
petitive advantage.77 Moreover, decreased transactional costs of
compiling and analyzing data through the use of computers, and
the increasing availability of individually identifiable informa-
tion, is substantially lowering the economic barriers for such
data use.78 As Whitaker notes, many have come to speak of this
as a contemporary "risk society.
79
73 See id. at 508-11 (discussing common-law protection of health informa-
tional privacy).
74 See REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS
BECOMING A REALITY 2-3 (1999).751d. at 45.
76 See John V. Jacobi, Canaries in the Coal Mine: The Chronically Ill in
Managed Care, 9 HEALTH MATRIx 79, 93 (1999) (stating that "because the risk as-
sumed under modem, largely managed care-based health insurance is larger than ever
... the incentives to pick and choose among potential insureds may be higher. [There
is a strong incentive] to eschew risk selection"); see also, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64-69 (1986)
(explaining the intricacies of risk assessment in insurance law); see generally, DON
PEPPERS & MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS
ONE CUSTOMER AT A TIME 123-124 (1993) (arguing that some customers have low or
negative value and might be eliminated from sales efforts or product access).
77 See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 18, 95-97, 107-13 (arguing that
information can assist organizations differentiate customers in order to gain increas-
ing "share of customer").
78 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 23. Although the authors of The One to One
Future suggest that the cost of "communication" and "information" will be zero, the
dramatic decrease in, at least, the transactional cost of data collection, analysis and
use is an underlying assumption of their vision of the "1:1" future. PEPPERS &
ROGERS, supra note 76, at 6, 7, 24 (recognizing the decreasing costs of information
processing asserting that these costs reduce "a thousand fold" every twenty years).79 WHITAKER, supra note 74, at 44.
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The compilation of such data, coupled with the powerful
incentives to use it, provide the ability to "exclude" individuals
from a wide range of commercial goods (e.g., in our contexts,
insurance, healthcare). Employers may utilize secondary-
information from other sources to evaluate an application for
employment and mortgage companies and other lenders already
utilize information from credit reporting agencies. in the health
care context, health information is compiled by companies, such
as the Medical Information Bureau, to help insurers identify ac-
tuarial risks based upon previously submitted enrollment
applications of individuals. 80
Such exclusions based upon the use of secondary informa-
tion raise a number of fundamental ethical issues: respect of
human autonomy, respect for selfhood and person, and disrup-
tion of important intimate relationships. 81 They also raise sig-
nificant utilitarian consequences such as disrupting the benefits
of primary information disclosure for the provision of services
(e.g., in our context, physician-patient services) by making par-
ticipants less likely to share important information, and the
positive externalities of full disclosure for collectively benefi-
cial secondary uses of information (e.g., in our context, public
health reporting).82
Putting a discussion of the negative affects of "exclusion-
ary" uses of information aside for the time being, secondary in-
formation is also used for "inclusionary" activities. Inclusionary
activities provide the opportunity to offer more highly custom-
ized and more selectively targeted consumer goods than ever
before.83 Perhaps the Internet is an emerging example of devel-
opment in this area. By providing personal information to a web
site, the web sites can "identify" the individual through "cook-
go See Savidge, supra note 11 (discussing how MIB collects and sells infor-
mation from insurance applicants); Reed, supra note 11 (same).
81 See Gostin, supra note 13, at 513-15 (discussing ethical justifications for
health information infrastructure).
82 Id. at 511.
83 See generally, PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 267-308 (discussing
the concept of targeting customers, not merely niche products and catering to an or-
ganization's individualized understanding, through consumer data, of consumer
needs); SETH GODIN, PERMISSION MARKETING: TURNING STRANGERS INTO FRIENDS,
AND FRIENDS INTO CUSTOMERS 24-39, 60-69 (1999) (arguing that "permission mar-
keting" will supplement interruption-based "mass marketing" and firms will develop
greater dialogue with consumers, learning more about them, so that consumers trust
firms and firms can education and tailor products to "their" consumers).
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ies" and provide content that the individual desires, such as spe-
cialized news and consumer goods.84 Just as likely, the web site
will use this information to present advertisements targeted to
the individual's profile, which may be annoying or an outright
intrusion. 8
5
In the health care context, use of secondary information for
"inclusionary" activities is already occurring. For example,
mailing efforts by MCOs, physician groups, or public health
agencies may be used to encourage mammography testing, pre-
natal check-up visits, sigmoidoscopy screening, immunizations,
and other services which will benefit populations. These efforts
compile information about populations, select individuals based
upon demographic information, and use a variety of tools to en-
courage them to seek the health care service suggested.
86
84 In the health care context, "cookies" are used by health-related sites. A
survey by California HealthCare Foundation found that eighteen of twenty-one
health-related web-sites it reviewed use "cookies." JANLORI GOLDMAN ET AL., CALI-
FORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUND., REPORT ON THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF
HEALTH WEB S=rES 25 (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.chcf.org/documents/
ihealth/privacywebreport.pdf. These enable the Web site to create a data profile of
that user as the user visits the web-site over time. "[Miost Web sites require users to
forgo privacy in order to take advantage of the services being offered." Id. at 15; see
also GODIN, supra note 83, at 133-34 (describing a company called Imgis that uses
cookies to track user data across multiple web sites in order to provide "customized"
banner ads).
85 See Bob Cook, Identity Crisis: Personal Information Is Price Docs Pay for
Free Online Services, MOD. PHYS., July 1, 1999, at 44 (noting that the "free" prod-
ucts and information offered by web-sites to physicians are paid for by information
that the physician offers explicitly and through the use of "cookies" and allows "ad-
vertisers to choose [which physicians] sees their advertisements" on the web-site);
see also Janet Gemignani, Who Sees Web Surfers' Health Concerns?, Bus. &
HEALTH, Mar. 1, 2000, at 9 (noting use of cookies and banner ads to track patient
information on health related web-sites has lead to privacy violations where nineteen
of the twenty-one most trafficked health related web-sites violated their own privacy
rules).
86 For an example of such a program, see M. Renneker & H. Saner, Low-Cost
Flexible Sigmoidoscopy Screening: A Community Demonstration And Education
Project, 10 J. CANCER EDUC. 25 (1995); see also Anita J. Slomski, Luring Patients
in for Preventive Care, MED. ECON., Dec. 22, 1997, at 51 (discussing computerized
prevention tracking system where patients are sent reminders to receive preventative
screens). Disease management programs are analogous, though more intensive, ex-
amples of how the use of specific healthcare information can improve population
health by targeting individuals in specific disease states. See Billie Heister Waldo,
Disease Management Gains Acceptance-and Finds Its Legs-With Automation, 18
NuRS. ECON., 208, 208 (2000) (discussing the use of "evidence-based medicine and
outcome data to improve the health of populations").
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Inclusionary efforts raise the same ethical and utilitarian
concerns as "exclusionary" activities, if only less acutely. First,
although ostensibly designed to provide the individual with a
consumer option, they often use information without consumer
awareness or permission. These efforts may be more about in-
creasing services (and revenues) and less about population
health. For example, efforts by pharmaceutical providers to en-
courage prescription refills have recently been attacked.87 They
therefore raise the same ethical issues regarding individual
autonomy as exclusionary uses. Second, it is often impossible to
differentiate truly "beneficial" information from the avalanche
of "interruption" 88 marketing.
In short, "inclusionary" activities may also be problematic.
Their value to the individual depends upon the utility they pro-
vide the individual and the individual's desire to be communi-
cated with. Indeed, in the case of inclusionary efforts, individu-
als may still be reluctant to disclose information about them-
selves for fear of unwanted communication.
It is also critical to note that information for "exclusionary"
purposes can also empower consumers. For example, forcing
MCOs to provide "report cards," HEDIS report, and other qual-
ity-oriented studies is an exclusionary use of data oriented to-
ward consumer choice. Individuals, or their expert purchasing
agents (e.g., employers offering healthcare coverage) may use
this information to differentiate insurers based upon quality,
cost, or other measures. This also extends to efforts such as re-
porting of cost information and outcomes by hospitals, actions
against individual physicians by Medical Boards, or physician
profiles by health plans. Ostensibly, by providing these indica-
tors, which may be required by governmental agencies or larger
purchasers, consumers or their agents are better able to make
choices about health care financing and delivery. In other
words, individuals directly, or through their expert agents, can
minimize their own risk and exclude plans and providers that
measure less favorably.
From here on, exclusionary uses will be divided into two
categories. Exclusionary uses by entities to deny individuals
87 See, e.g., Michael Slezak, Chains Rethink Compliance After Patient Up-
roar: Refill Reminders May Require Patient Consent, AM. DRUGGIST, May 1998, at
10 (describing the controversy arising from pharmacies giving the names of custom-
ers to an outside firm, which sent prescription reminders to patients).88 See GODIN, supra note 83, at 24-29.
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consumer benefits will be termed "first-order exclusionary
uses." Exclusionary benefits to benefit consumer decisionmak-
ing in order to exclude organizations providing lesser benefit
will be termed "second-order exclusionary uses."
The inclusionary/exclusionary framework is important for
our purposes because it is a simplified framework that will be
used later to highlight the deficiencies of the current health care
information market and the benefits of the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust. Specifically, it will be used to highlight the current
market's inability, in the face of default privacy rules, to opti-
mize the value of secondary use health care data (particularly
for individuals) as well as the advantages of the Healthcare In-
formation Trust in realizing this value.
B. Economics of Medical Records and Default Rules
Information is, arguably, the principal product purchased
by patients when consulting health care providers; "information
.. is precisely what is being bought from most physicians, and,
indeed, from most professionals." 89 This information not only
has a primary value to consumers as part of the bundle of goods
and services purchased during an episode of care, but, as has
been discussed, has a substantial secondary value. Two markets
are quickly emerging in most consumer transactions today: first,
the value of the initial products and services; second, and some-
times just as importantly, the secondary value created in the in-
formation concerning the transaction.90 As both Murphy and
Schwartz point out, at issue is who, in a voluntary contractual
setting, should be the default owner of the secondary usage of
the information. That is, should a default privacy rule (patient
owner) or should a default disclosure rule (provider, MCO/in-
surer, third party as owner) prevail? 91
89 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 946 (1963); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 12-
16 (showing that a core component of the delivery of medical care today is the use of
digitalized medical records for "multifunctional" purposes).
90 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2402 (discussing secondary information as a
"commodity that can be sold in a well-developed market"); Schwartz, supra note 11,
at 23 (discussing how consumer preferences can be cheaply processed and combined
with other personal data).
91 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2402-04 (discussing default privacy rules in
the context of the value of privacy).
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In the most simplistic situation where parties have equal
bargaining leverage, information, and choice, this issue is far
less complicated; presumably, with all transaction costs being
low, the parties will be aware of the secondary value of this in-
formation and freely negotiate. The party most valuing the in-
formation will prevail and a price, including the cost of the in-
formation, will be incorporated into the transaction.
92
Most, if not all markets operate with some distortions, re-
quiring the law to recognize the most efficient default rule: pri-
vacy or disclosure.9 3 The traditional economic view is that de-
fault disclosure rules are optimal in that "restrictions on the
flow of information in the name of privacy are generally not
social wealth maximizing, because they inhibit decisionmaking,
increase transaction costs, and encourage fraud. 94 Murphy and
Schwartz argue, however, that some information markets, such
as the one in health care, have significant distortions, leading to
the conclusion that a default privacy rule is optimal. Further, as
Murphy argues, these distortions justify more than a default
rule, and require "information-forcing" disclosures to individu-
als.95 There are four major classifications of these distortions:
(1) effect of disclosure-default on the underlying socially bene-
ficial activity; (2) a legitimate, non-fraud oriented "taste for pri-
vacy;" (3) asymmetrical information about the secondary mar-
ket value of personally identifiable information; and (4) transac-
tion costs.
Murphy promotes a default privacy rule in markets, such as
health care, where disclosure default rules have the potential to
substantially decrease the overall amount of primary informa-
tion disclosed. Murphy recognizes that where individuals, fear-
92 See id. at 2403 (noting that the primary question is the size of transaction
costs).
93 See id. at 2404 (finding that "[t]he initial question is the ex ante question:
Would the parties agree to disclosure of this sort? Or, using a more categorical ap-
proach: What is the appropriate default rule for transactions of this sort?").
94 Id. at 2382.
95 Id. at 2416 (suggesting that "imposing nondisclosure obligations on the
recipient of the information may be the best approach for certain categories of
information"); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 73-74 (discussing the need for a default
privacy rule when attempting to access patient information). Schwartz also notes that
due to the unequal information and bargaining power between health care industry
organizations and individuals, the health care industry organizations, covered by the
default privacy rule, would be required to explicitly inform individuals of the secon-
dary uses for which they seek to use individually identifiable healthcare information.
Id. at 61-64.
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ful of secondary disclosures, seek less of the underlying socially
beneficial activity (e.g., provision of health care), or at least
hide information useful for the efficient provision of the so-
cially beneficial activity, the primary and secondary markets
may be hampered.96 This is the economic manifestation of the
same "utilitarian" concerns expressed earlier in the Note.
Unlike previous economic views, Murphy recognizes the
legitimacy of a "taste for privacy," which may be oriented to-
ward a true utility for privacy of certain sensitive information,
such as that often arising in health care.97 Although Posner
would caution against privacy as a refuge for those who would
hide their true nature in order to commit fraud,98 health care is
full of situations where privacy might be valued without any
offsetting social/economic fraud cost. For example, although a
default disclosure rule may be optimal for an individual's credit
record due the tangible possibility of fraud,99 it is not clear that
a default disclosure rule would be optimal for health care re-
cords that reveal certain socially stigmatizing procedures, such
as a woman's abortion history. Moreover, as Schwartz argues,
the benefits of full disclosure of health care information, par-
ticularly genomic information, may be overstated in many
cases.100
Therefore, given the socially sensitive nature of much of a
person's medical record, there may be a legitimate "taste for
privacy" having no fraud implications.10 1 Although this taste for
privacy may not, in itself, balance the scales in favor of a pri-
vacy default rule, it is one more factor in its favor.
Health care also is fraught with asymmetrical information
problems. In the context of a market for health care information,
providers, MCOs, insurers and other third parties are in a posi-
tion far superior to individuals in evaluating the true value of
secondary health care information. In this way, firms take ad-
vantage of a "monopoly equilibrium," exploiting consumer ig-
96 Murphy, supra note 2, at 2387.
97 Id. at 2396.98 See id. at 2398 (noting that fraud inhibits a group from recognizing the
heterogeneity of its membership, forcing the entire group to subsidize the unequal
costs of its members).
99 See id. at 2411-12 (discussing implied privacy contracts).
100 For example, Schwartz argues that genomic information may only be used
to reinforce employers "taste for discrimination." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 25-26.101 Murphy, supra note 2, at 2396.
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norance to gain the most favorable terms possible for the data
use.'0 2 These entities do not disclose the value of the health care
information. Further, they have the potential to use broad and
vague waiver forms that consumers will often accept without
question.
°3
Finally, these authors recognize the role of transaction costs
in the selection of a default privacy rule. While Posner and the
traditional law-economics school argue that transaction costs of
gaining permission to use valuable information should weigh
heavily in favor of adopting default disclosure rules, Schwartz
and Murphy raise valid counter arguments. First, Schwartz sug-
gests that transaction costs are decreasing; in particular, the cost
of asking and tracking the preferences of consumers has be-
come, if collected up front, minimal.1°4 With modem technol-
ogy, and with the fact that the product provider typically creates
the "contract," it is not as costly for producers to inform con-
sumers of the value of their information, allow consumers to
specify their privacy interest, and track and safeguard this pref-
erence. 10 5 For example, the product provider may offer the cus-
tomer a choice to opt-in or opt-out of the advertising. 0 6 For in-
stance, individuals may choose to participate in their local su-
permarket's discount program whereby they allow their pur-
chases to be tracked in exchange for discounted pricing. 10 7 The
supermarket can then use the information for a variety of sec-
ondary uses, not directly related to the actual purchase, such as
direct marketing through mailings and special rebate offers to
encourage selection of more profitable products.
Second, Murphy recognizes that transaction costs are im-
portant in deciding which default rule is, relatively, the most
efficient. He asks which of the two parties have the higher cost
102 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 61 (discussing legislation that requires notice
of information that will facilitate competitive equilibrium between the individual and
the health care industry).
103 See Gostfn, supra note 13, at 523-24 (discussing the theory behind routine
disclosures); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 61, 64 (suggesting that the law
needs to evolve to ensure that individuals are adequately informed before being al-
lowed to consent to the disclosure of personal medical information).
104 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 23-24.
105 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2413 (discussing the relative transaction
costs of contracting out of default disclosure rules).
106 See id. (noting that a merchant could sell consumer information simply by
placing a "check-off box on the consumer-merchant contract").
107 See id. (noting that the grocery merchant prominently display a notice
concerning the information use).
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in "contracting-out" of the default rule.10 8 Undoubtedly, observ-
ing the various distortions in the health care market already dis-
cussed, individuals have a far higher cost than IDSs and MCOs
in determining and structuring a solution to contract out of the
default rule.109 Therefore, relative transaction costs in most
health care transactions also favor a default privacy rule.
Schwartz argues that a simple default rule is not enough
and that a legislative or regulatory framework must follow
health care information through all of its various uses, not just
the initial transaction, because of what he describes as the mul-
tifunctional nature of the increasingly digitalized health re-
cord." 0 Schwartz recognizes that a default privacy rule would
allow certain exceptions including safe-harbor uses "compatible
with the original collection" (e.g., direct medical care, legiti-
mate sharing between providers for health services, and finan-
cial transactions such as for billing purposes).11' In addition, the
privacy default would not be imposed for legally mandated re-
porting such as for public health, social service reporting such
as for child abuse, and for certain medical research. 112 Adopting
Gostin's concept of information holders as "trustees," the hold-
ers of health care information would also have explicit restric-
tions on the use of data requiring disclosures of only the mini-
mum amount necessary, based upon legitimate need-to-know.
1 3
The ability of a consumer to accept payment for release of
her data rights assumes that the consumer understands and can
enforce the bargain. One might question whether the typical su-
permarket shopper realizes that the pricing discounts she re-
ceives is in exchange for her buying pattern data. To this end,
Schwartz would require that proposed legislation/regulations
would also have substantial "information-forcing" and enforce-
108 See id. at 2412 (using the Coase Theorem to determine that the parties will
allocate the right to the party who values it the most).
109 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 54 (discussing that the establishment of a
default rule on privacy will lower transaction costs as fewer parties are forced to ne-
gotiate around the law).
110 Id. at 14-17 (stating that by its very nature, the computer changes personal
information into a fluid form and therefore the need of protections should be bal-
anced with societal use).
.". Id. at59.
112 See id. at 69.
113 Gostin, supra note 13, at 524-25; see Schwartz, supra note 11, at 57-60
(outlining the necessary components of an effective statutory scheme for the control
of medical data).
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ment provisions. These provisions would ensure that the indi-
vidual knows about her property rights in the data, can enforce
this right, and can gain access to her records. The organization
seeking to use her data for secondary purposes would be forced
to provide a waiver form, designed in the regulations, which the
individual could not be forced to sign.1 14 In addition, Schwartz
and other commentators recognize the critical need for health
trustee accountability for the use of data and call for mandatory
electronic audit trails describing all the access to, and use of,
personally identifiable health information to assist individuals
and their third-parties in policing appropriate use.115 Finally,
Gostin and Schwartz advocate the right of an individual to copy,
review, and correct personal data.116 This particular right may
have substantial implications, which will be discussed later in
this section.
C. The Privacy Default Rule in Action - HHS Electronic
Medical Records Standards
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
released final rules for standards of privacy for individually
identifiable health information.1 17 These rules were released un-
der the auspices of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996,118 requiring HHS, in absence of con-
gressional action, to propose privacy rules for electronic re-
cords.1 19 By-and-large, these regulations realize most of
Gostin's and Schwartz's default privacy rule visions for uses of
114 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 59-60 (discussing how the need to obtain
medical consent of the individual before using or disclosing health care data will
signal to the uninformed party about important contingencies causing negotiation for
terms that better reflect the parties wishes may be added); Gostin, supra note 13, at
522-24 (discussing patients right's in their health information).
115 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 63 (stating that one reason to advise health
care consumers that people have accessed their records is to encourage "audit trails
on a prophylactic basis"); Gostin, supra note 13, at 526 n.341 (discussing audit
trails).
16 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 62; Gostin, supra note 13, at 524.
117 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164 (2000).
118 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. Law
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
119 Id. § 264(c)(1) (providing "[i]f legislation governing standards with re-
spect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information ... is not enacted
by [August 21, 1999], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promulgate
final regulations containing such standards not later than [February 21, 2000]").
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information where a "consent" is required for disclosures re-
lated to provision of care, payment, and health care operations
and a written "authorization" is required for many others.
1 20
For the purposes of this Note, there are several critical out-
comes of the Murphy/Schwartz model and the HHS regulations.
As Schwartz and Murphy both note, with the imposition of a
privacy default rule, a new economic picture comes into clarity.
In essence, the individual, for the first time, becomes a player in
the emerging market for health care information. The IDS, indi-
vidual provider, MCO or other health plan entity, and data
clearinghouses are forced to negotiate with the individual in or-
der to be able to use that information in a secondary market.
1 2 1
In fact, the covered entity must use an authorization form,
which requires an explicit description of the proposed uses of
the individual's health care information. 122 Further, the form
notifies the individual of his right to refuse to sign the authori-
zation, 123 and the covered entity is barred from conditioning its
services on the individual's decision,1 2 4 except in certain, speci-
fied situations. 1
25
The HHS regulations also incorporate individuals' access
to their medical records. 126 Although the commentators regard
this requirement as critical for ensuring accurate and complete
information, and to ensure legitimacy and transparency in medi-
cal record management, 127 the requirement may have broader
120 The final rule presents a separate "consent" for uses of healthcare informa-
tion for the provision of treatment, payment and healthcare operation. 45 C.F.R. §
164.506.
121 Id. § 164.514(e). The Final Standards for Privacy provide for an exception
for certain types of marketing activities by a covered entity. Id. § 164.514(e)(2)-
(f)(2). There are, however, significant restrictions placed on this marketing use. For
example, it must come from the covered entity (or a business associate contracted to
make the communication) and the covered entity must disclose if it received remu-
neration for the marketing. Id. § 164.514(e)(3). Such limitations, coupled with the
agency and competition distortions faced by covered entities, as discussed infra Part
I, make it unlikely that a strong secondary market could emerge.
'2 Id. § 164.508(c).
'23 Id. § 164.508 (d)(1)(iii)(B).
124 Id. § 164.508 (d)(1)(i), (e)(1)(ii).
'25 See id. § 164.508(b)(4)(i)-(iv).
126 See id. §164.524.
127 Gostin, supra note 13, at 524. 'Transparency" is achieved by making indi-
viduals aware of their privacy rights in information and providing them a mechanism
to guard against improper or erroneous use of the information. This is achieved by
providing individuals (1) access to their medical information, (2) the right to modify
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implications. Insofar as the regulations recognize an individ-
ual's property rights in her medical records, including the right
to "copy ' 128 these records, the individual, or her agent, may be
given the right to disgorge the electronic records from the con-
solidated clinical data repositories of the IDS, MCO or data re-
pository (each falling within the framework of the HHS rules),
for use by the individual.
This ability could have striking implications for the feasi-
bility of a far more dynamic health information market. This
market, as will be envisioned in the last section, may allow the
individual to use a new agent, the Healthcare Information Trust,
to bypass IDS/MCO control over her medical records for secon-
dary data use.
PART II: EXISTING HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS AS HEALTHCARE
INFORMATION TRUSTEES
Having established the practical and technical possibilities
of, at least, a non-dynamic longitudinal medical record, and
having shown that a market for such data, in which individuals
can participate, may become a reality, this third part questions
whether existing market players, particularly MCOs and IDSs,
are adequate organizers of the longitudinal medical record and
brokers of personally identifiable health records on behalf of
individuals. Although Schwartz and Murphy establish a pro-
tected role for individuals in this new market, they do not ad-
dress this question explicitly.
The existing players, primarily MCOs, IDSs, are sub-
optimal integrators of a true longitudinal medical record. This
section will discuss the economic, agency and competitive mar-
ket barriers to MCOs, IDSs, as well as possible industry
cooperatives of IDSs and MCOs, emerging in this role.
or correct this information; and (3) requiring the organization to have audit records
detailing the use of their data. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 61-63.
128 See 45 C.F.R. §164.524(a) providing a "right of access to inspect and ob-
tain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated re-
cord set" of a covered entity).
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A. Health Care Information Market Distortions in the
Murphy/Schwartz Model
Returning to the theoretical inclusionary/exclusionary
framework discussed previously, the Murphy/Schwartz model
of the emerging secondary health care market is problematic.
Negotiations between individuals and these entities allow these
entities to purchase information primarily for inclusionary pur-
poses and for first-order exclusionary purposes against the indi-
vidual.
The Murphy/Schwartz model is not dynamic enough to re-
alize second-order exclusionary uses of data for use by the indi-
vidual. Historical medical information has substantial value in
its aggregate form, across populations, to give individuals in-
formation concerning cost and quality of health services. As has
been discussed, this is the driving force behind regulatory in-
formation disclosure. 129 Of course, an individual's ability to re-
alize personal value in this information is contingent on a
broader ability to aggregate this information with other indi-
viduals in order to analyze it for second-order exclusionary
benefit. As will be discussed, MCOs and IDSs have little incen-
tive to use this information for such purposes. For now, it is im-
portant to note that an individual, independently, has no ability
in the Murphy/Schwartz model to realize this potential second-
order exclusionary value in his medical information.
The Murphy/Schwartz model also suffers in that it does not
recognize a variety of factors in the health care market that will
confound effective valuation of health care data. It does not
recognize the oligopolistic nature of the emerging IDS/MCO
industry, the individual's lack of choice in MCOs, and the insti-
tutional inability of MCOs and IDSs to maximize the value of
the secondary health care market data.
As previously discussed, the emerging MCO and IDS mar-
kets are consolidating at record pace. It is clear that, in most
metropolitan markets, a handful of major provider networks/
health systems are materializing. 130 An individual's ability,
129 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1715-20 (discussing competitively motivated
disclosure laws).
130 In reviewing fifteen communities nation-wide, authors conclude that, al-
though the delivery of healthcare has not yet followed suit:
Markets are becoming more competitive. Providers that have always com-
peted for individual patients on the basis of individual reputations and rela-
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therefore, to shop for an IDS using the treatment of secondary
health care information is, limited by the oligopolistic nature of
the emerging market.
The selection process for MCOs may be even more con-
strained. Typically, non-Medicare/Medicaid individuals receive
health plan benefits through their employers in this country-
coverage that is typically in an MCO. 131 In most instances,
choice of health plan coverage is substantially restricted; em-
ployers may offer only a few, and perhaps only one, MCO op-
tion. 132 In these situations, selection of a health plan based upon
its use of secondary health care information use would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the individual. Further, as will be
tionships with other providers now are competing for blocs of patients on
the basis of price and organizational reputation. In response to this, health
care markets are consolidating at a rapid pace. Hospitals are consolidating
most rapidly, and physicians least rapidly.
Paul B. Ginsburg, The RWJF Community Snapshots Study: Introduction and Over-
view, HEALTH AFF. Summer 1996, at 15; see also Linda T. Kohn, Organizing and
Managing Care in a Changing Health System, 34 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 37, 42 (2000)
(noting in a study that "[h]ospital consolidation was happening rapidly across all
study sites.... [finding that] [i]n 10 of the 12 markets, over 50 percent of the volume
was captured by the top four hospitals or hospital systems"). The future of the IDSs
may be much more based upon strategic "e-business" connections, than outright
ownership of all components of care. See Integration Strategies, supra note 29 (stat-
ing that "[t]he IDS based on full ownership is giving way to an IDS that relies to
some degree on virtual relationships, or affiliations.... [and] [ijntegration of those
relationships probably will be achieved through some kind of e-health connection");
see also Stephen M. Shortell, Slowly Remaking the U.S. Healthcare System, 35
HEALTH SERVS. RES., 1, 1-2 (2000) (noting that hospital and institutional providers
"are more evolved in the natural history of the organizational lifecycle than is the
medical profession. For example, the hospital sector has changed from a cottage in-
dustry, up until the decade of the 1980s, to an entity that now comprises a high de-
gree of consolidation: approximately 72 percent of the nation's hospitals belong to a
network or system").
131 See Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models for
Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 637
(1997) (estimating that seventy-three percent of Americans who receive health insur-
ance through their employers are enrolled in MCOs).
132 See Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Danger-
ous Combination, 72 WASH. L. REV. 315, 349 (1997) (noting that "[a]ccording to
recent studies, forty-five percent of individuals who get their health insurance
through their employers are offered only one plan, and fifty-two percent of midsize
employers" offer only one plan; moreover, where employees can choose among
plans, good information about plan quality is lacking); see also Dayna Bowen Mat-
thew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance:
Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037,
1045-47 (1996) (describing four techniques employers use to cut health insurance
costs).
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discussed, the purchasing agents may not incorporate such con-
siderations into their decisionmaking and may have contrary
incentives against such restrictions of secondary use data.
Even if individuals were able to exercise a legitimate mar-
ket choice concerning IDSs or MCOs based upon the considera-
tion that they offer for secondary health care data use, these or-
ganizations will substantially undervalue the market price for
secondary health care data. Neither IDSs nor MCOs are likely
to offer this information to the full range of purchasers. For ex-
ample, competing IDSs and MCOs are not likely to voluntarily
offer their patient information, a valuable resource, to compet-
ing JIDSs/MCOs, even if these organizations value secondary-
use information more highly than the original compiling
IDS/MCO. In addition, IDSs may be unsophisticated brokers of
information themselves, lacking the administrative and techni-
cal expertise to maximize the value of this information for any-
thing other than their particular secondary uses.
All of these imperfections suggest that most consumer de-
cisions to waive protection of their secondary health care in-
formation will be a choice absent an optimal economic incen-
tive to encourage waiver. That is, individuals will waive their
rights to these data only if they, despite the HHS proposed rule
protections, are indifferent to privacy concerns or are entirely
uninformed about the value of their data. Moreover, even if
IDSs or MCOs offer discounts or actual payments for this
waiver, these payments will likely be less than the true value of
this information in a more dynamic market. Although this mar-
ket distortion, insofar as it over inflates the population of indi-
viduals selecting total privacy, may be a desirable balance ac-
cording to some privacy advocates, it defaults to a sub-optimal
use of this resource. This distortion, however, could create the
opportunity for new market entities, such as the Healthcare In-
formation Trust, that can better value and compete for the right
to use secondary health care information.
B. Agency and Competition Problems
Agency relationships in health care today are multifaceted
and often ambiguous.13 What is clear, however, is that agency
and fiduciary obligations play a crucial role for unsophisticated
133 See Sage, supra note 25, 1752-64 (discussing ambiguities in the agency
rationale).
[Vol. 12:393
THE HEALTHCARE INFORMATION TRUST
consumers faced with insurance and health care provision
choices. 134 The growth of IDSs and MCOs as primary organiz-
ers of longitudinal medical records and information brokers suf-
fers from substantial agency/fiduciary problems, which may
make them unattractive in this role for individuals. Returning,
again, to our inclusionary/exclusionary framework, MCOs and
IDSs lack incentives to aggregate data for second-order exclu-
sionary purposes. Further, they have substantial incentives to
use longitudinal medical records for first-order exclusionary
purposes against individuals.
1. Agency Problems
Sage presents an interesting picture of the agency problems
arising in today's health care system. 135 Prior to the current
market-oriented managed care competition system, agency and
fiduciary concerns were far less acute.136 As cost control meas-
ures in health care financing have become a driving force in the
delivery of services, a fracture has occurred between what Sage
describes as the individual/professional and the collec-
tive/economic interests of both the health care financing and
health care delivery stakeholders.137 This is best illustrated by
contrasting the traditional individual/professional agency and
fiduciary obligations of the physician-patient relationship,
138
with the collective/economic fiduciary obligations imposed by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to
maximize the financial resources of the plan.
139
The real picture is, however, far more muddled. Managed
competition imposes new agency obligations onto physicians
and other providers. Physicians may accept a role as primary
care gatekeepers with multiple obligations to both patient (con-
tractual and fiduciary) as well as proxy managers of subsequent
referrals and health service utilization for MCOs (contrac-
134 See id. at 1743-45 (discussing the general nature of agency relationships in
health care).135 Id. at 1743-64.
136 See id. at 1744 (noting that the "rapid conversion of the American health
system to managed care has magnified the need to safeguard agency relationships").
137 Id. at 1752.
138 See id. at 1752-57.
139 See id. at 1744-45 (noting that "trustees administering ERISA plans owe
their loyalty to the plan, not individual beneficiaries").
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tual).14° Specialist physicians may be contractors with MCOs
where their payment, through withholds or other mechanisms, is
based upon health care claims experience of their patients.'
41
Moreover, as Sage notes, individual physicians may have even
less control over patients in developing IDSs which, them-
selves, have a myriad of often conflicting agency relationships
and financial incentives. 42 Indeed, IDSs may accept capitation
agreements, which align their financial incentives toward col-
lective/economic duties and away from obligations to the indi-
vidual patient. These conflicting obligations are, therefore, not
simply between the individual/professional duties of health care
providers and the collective/economic obligations of health care
financing entities; these two conflicting obligations have been,
to a greater or lesser degree, internalized into health care deliv-
erers.
This agency obligation challenge is, perhaps, even more
exacerbated in the employer/employee and the benefici-
ary/government-as-payor relationships. As already stated, ER-
ISA plans have a primary fiduciary obligation to the collective
performance of the plan, with limited, if any, obligation to an
individual's heterogeneous needs outside of the collective. 143
Moreover, the government, as payor in Medicare and Medicaid
programs, has made substantial moves to control, or at least
make more predictable, collective costs through Medicare
HMOs, 144 Medicare+Choice 145 and state-driven Medicaid man-
14' See id. at 1745-46 (discussing how changes in managed care payment
systems have motivated physicians to become more concerned with finance rather
than patient care).
141 See id. at 1745 n.151 (discussing how managed care has developed an
extraordinary diversity of provider compensation mechanisms).
142 Id. at 1754 (discussing how institutional processes such as the health plan
can often effect overall quality when compared to physicians serving as individuals'
agents).
141 Id. at 1755 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
144 See, e.g., Marilyn Moon & Karen Davis, Preserving and Strengthening
Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 31-32 (discussing advantages and disadvan-
tages of private sector ability to control Medicare cost through managed care pro-
grams and governmental focus on this strategy).
145 See John K. Iglehart, Bringing Forth Medicare+Choice: HCFA's Robert
A. Berenson, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb., 1999, at 144, 149 (discussing HCFA's program
improvement efforts).
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aged care programs. 146 This demonstrates federal and state gov-
ernment's focus on its collective obligation.
Therefore, although such incentives encourage larger pur-
chasers to force IDSs and MCOs to report information that al-
lows them to differentiate by access, price and quality, this dis-
closure may well be used against individuals. Schwartz outlines
several instances where this has already been the case in the
employer-employee relationship including the use of health his-
tory in hiring decisions. 147
2. Competition Problems
In addition to agency problems in the secondary health care
information market, IDSs and MCOs face substantial barriers in
seeking to use information for inclusionary and second-order
exclusionary uses to benefit consumers. Although expanding the
amount of information usable by consumers and providers is a
well-regarded strategy, 148 regulatory disclosure schemes are in-
adequate to realize the full potential of a longitudinal medical
record. Moreover, the structure of the MCO and IDS market,
lack of adequate information incorporated in an individual or-
ganization, and lack of adequate incentives to coordinate infor-
mation among competitors, may make it impossible to realize
the benefits of a fully "inclusive" and "comprehensive" con-
solidation of longitudinal medical records in the existing health
care market.
Notwithstanding the growing consolidation of MCOs and
IDSs, the health care market is not monopolistic in most cases.
Purchasers of health plan/MCO services and medical care often
switch between various competing organizations. 149 This is
quite pronounced in the employer health insurance arena where
employees may frequently change plans at the end of coverage
146 See, e.g., ROBERT HURLEY & STEPHEN ZucKERMAN, URBAN INSTITUTE,
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: STATE FLEXIBILITY IN ACTION 8-11 (Mar. 2002) (discuss-
ing the origins of Medicaid managed care and motivations, among others, to make
costs more predictable and to reduce program expenses).
147 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 28-31 (explaining how increased disclosure
may allow employers access to potentially harmful health information, which could
increase health-related discrimination against employees).
148 Sage, supra note 25, at 1704.
149 See Peter J. Cunningham & Linda Kohn, Health Tracking; Health Plan
Switching: Choice Or Circumstance?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 158-59 (not-
ing that seventeen percent of privately insured persons changed their health plan dur-
ing the year prior to the survey).
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periods. This mobility, often based more on employer plan
changes than any other factors, 150 not only complicates the in-
centives to develop strategies for long-term population health
performance, 151 but fractures the full record of individuals
among competing MCOs and competing IDSs.
Some commentators observe that MCOs, due to their char-
acteristics as large-population data-holders, are attractive con-
solidators of health care information.152 Further, for at least as
long as an individual is covered by the MCO, the MCO holds
information about utilization across providers, thus integrating
information regardless of where an individual is treated, provid-
ing a claim is submitted. MCOs, however, do not have the com-
prehensive medical record of patients. 5
3
Likewise, although IDSs are beginning to compile greater
clinical information, individuals may often seek care outside of
a particular IDS, either with still-independent providers or with
a competing delivery system. Thus, although they can increas-
ingly integrate information within their own system, large holes
exist in their records.
The current market lacks a mechanism or entity to coordi-
nate secondary health care information across organizations.
Sage suggests that a system of mandatory reporting of politi-
cally chosen cost, access and quality measures could address
current inadequacy in use of health information for the benefit
of consumers. However, such a regimen, even if it could realize
Sage's criteria for success, still suffers from this fractionaliza-
tion of information. That is, the reporting will not incorporate
the full records of individuals, but rather, snapshots of the popu-
lations within MCOs or those using IDS services during the pe-
riod. This brings us back to a vision of either a single, regional
repository of a fully integrated medical record for individuals
150 See id. (noting that most plan changes were made for reasons other than
consumer preference, including 33% due to employment change, 36.3% due to
change in employer plan offerings; 16% changed because the current plan is less
expensive; only 8% changed because their current plan has better services, higher
quality, preferred doctors, or more convenient locations).
1 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1777 (discussing how stable enrollment in a
health care plan by an individual is necessary to facilitate practice-based research and
to motivate health plans to focus on long-term performance).
152 See id. at 1726-27 (discussing the advantages of centralized disclosure by
health plans).
151 Id. at 1727.
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or, at least, agreements among competing systems to allow
shared use of medical records.
MCOs and IDSs, however, lack the financial incentives to
cooperate in such a manner. First, organizations realize the stra-
tegic value of health information they hold; they understand that
the use of this information to differentiate themselves based
upon "inclusionary" benefits to the individual would be lost if
the information were released to a collective entity. Second, the
information, particularly if it is comprehensive, has the poten-
tial to be used for second-order exclusionary purposes with un-
certain consequences to the contributing organization. Although
organizations perceiving their services to be higher quality may
be more inclined to share, at least some organizations would
realize the risk in such cooperation. The free-rider problem
where only a few voluntarily share information would make it
infeasible to implement a comprehensive longitudinal medical
record or voluntary information disclosures under the current
system without substantial governmental intervention. 15
4
Moreover, the funding and structure of such cooperative ef-
forts would be problematic. These efforts pose significant anti-
trust implications, particularly where cost and pricing informa-
tion may be shared. 155 But more than this, the practical ability of
various competitors coming together and agreeing on anything
more than the sharing of generic discharge or outpatient infor-
mation, stripped of individually identifiable information, is
probably not feasible. As one privacy advocate notes,
"[c]ommand over information and its transmission will be the
key to success in the capitalist world of tomorrow. The notion
that this crucial resource will be [voluntarily] allowed to be-
come a public good is idealism at its most inane."
156
154 See Ren6 Bowser & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Managed Care and the Health of
a Nation, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1281 (1999) (describing how the government
must take on some leadership role in the oversight of managed health care if non-
competitive information sharing is to be successful).
155 See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATEMENTS
OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE § 3, http://www.fte.gov/re-
ports/hlth3s.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (discussing the antitrust implications of
hospital joint ventures).156 WHITAKER, supra note 74, at 69.
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3. Examples of Agency and Competition Problems
There are examples that demonstrate the agency and the
competitive problems in the emergence of market collaborations
to manage secondary health care data. The examples, discussed
below, include: (1) the Medical Information Bureau; (2) the
Massachusetts Health Data Consortium, Inc. and its Affiliated
Health Information Network of New England; and (3) Health
Action Council's Cleveland Health Quality Choice initiative.
The Medical Information Bureau is an insurance industry
medical information clearinghouse.157 The clearinghouse gath-
ers information from approximately 700 insurance companies in
the United States and Canada, which also fund its operation. 158
The companies that the Medical Information Bureau serve rep-
resent ninety-nine percent of the individual life insurance poli-
cies and eighty percent of health and disability policies issued
in the United States and Canada.159
The Medical Information Bureau currently holds files on
over fifteen million Americans. 160 It collects medical informa-
tion from people who apply for insurance policies, which is then
computerized and sold back to other participating insurance
companies when they evaluate an enrollee for subsequent cov-
erage.161 Its files track over 230 coded medical conditions, and
has other information concerning behavioral risk factors and
limited financial credit information.1 6
2
As one privacy advocate noted, the Medical Information
Bureau is not a service for individual consumers. 163 It is, how-
ever, an excellent proxy for the type of collaborative efforts
most likely to spontaneously emerge from a competitive insur-
ance-driven MCO market. The Medical Information Bureau op-
erates exclusively to provide first-order exclusionary benefit for
the insurance industry. It is fascinating to note the age of the
organization. The organization was founded in 1890 as an in-
formal group of insurance company directors meeting to avoid
157 Savidge, supra note 11, at Dl.
258 Reed, supra note II.
159 Savidge, supra note I1, at Dl.
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Id. Examples of behavior risk factors are adverse driving records and
whether the applicant fly small planes. Id.
163 See id. (quoting Janlori Goldman, who notes that the MIB is "not inter-
ested in talking about what they do").
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fraud and minimize financial risk.164 This aptly demonstrates
that, even in competitive markets, collaboration that holds a
strong economic benefit to constituents will tend to emerge.
However, there is no indication that the Medical Information
Bureau might evolve beyond its current, and highly successful,
role.
In a number of markets nationally, consortiums of hospitals
and health systems, health plans, and governmental agencies
have developed to create regional networks to share various
medical information among health care industry constituents.1 65
The Massachusetts Health Data Consortium, Inc. (Consortium)
and its Affiliated Health Information Network of New England
(AHINNE), recognized by the Robert Woods Johnson Founda-
tion as one of a number of successful regional organizers of in-
formation, is a solid and progressive example of such consor-
tium groups.
The Consortium was created in 1978 by a number of Mas-
sachusetts' major public and private health care organiza-
tions. 166 The objective of the Consortium was to facilitate,
through a non-partial intermediary, the collection, analysis and
dissemination of health care information. 167 Throughout its
twenty-two year history, it has been extremely successfully in
creating a variety of information reports, 68 products169 and da-
tabases.1 70
164 id.
165 See Press Release, Minnesota Health Data Institute, Health Privacy and
Technology Effort Receives $2.5 Million National Grant for Five State Project (Jan.
11, 2000) (noting leading regional consortiums receiving Robert Wood Johnson
grants to develop secure email protocol: Massachusetts Health Data Consortium
(MHDC), Minnesota Health Data Institute (MHDI), North Carolina Health Informa-
tion and Communications Alliance (NCHICA), Utah Health Information Network
(UHIN) and the Pacific Northwest-based Community Health Information Technology
Alliance (CHITA) which is a program of the Foundation for Health Care Quality in
Seattle), http:llwww.mhdilpress-releases/2000/pr-1-11-2000.html.
166 MASSACHUSET'S HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: BACKGROUND AND HIs-
TORY, at http://www.mahealthdata.org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/Documents/Background (last
visited Mar. 21, 2002).167 id.
168 See MASSACHUSETrS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: 20 YEARS IN HEALTH
CARE, at http:/www.mahealthdata.orgmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e8525645
80073a9fd/b88319ae14ce86268525663b0067b05e?OpenDocument (last visited Mar.
21, 2002) (noting the 1978 establishment of a patient database on all Massachusetts
residents permitting detection of patterns of disease and treatment; 1979 patient ori-
gin study determining where residents receive inpatient treatment; 1983 comparison
of costs in the State's 111 acute-care hospitals; 1988 physician supply study; 1989
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Today the Consortium encompasses an impressive list of
institutional, technology, and partner organizations spanning the
New England health care market.171 In 1994 the Consortium es-
tablished AHINNE in an effort to facilitate the development of
a regional "electronic network for moving, storing and sharing
patient information" and to "link providers, payers, employers,
government agencies, physician offices and others and measure
outcomes, analyze care costs and support care delivery."
172
The Consortium and its AHINNE effort have been impres-
sive and should in no way be discounted. Their various data
products and databases have, undoubtedly, provided a wide
range of inclusionary and exclusionary benefits to the region's
health care users and expert purchasers, as shown by the wide
range of utilization, cost, and public health reporting initiatives.
Nonetheless, the Consortium's collected data, and market
reports primarily focuses on aggregate inpatient discharge and
outpatient procedural data.173 The nature of the reporting, such
as hospital discharge and outpatient procedure information, is
likely to be a strong benefit to each of the market participants,
particularly the participating hospitals, in identifying market-
share, facility/service planning and cost comparisons that the
member institutions can access for their own planning inter-
ests. 174 Moreover, the Consortium notes, in its case studies, a
studies of elders, mothers and children utilizing state data to monitor access, quality
and cost) [hereinafter 20 YEARS IN HEALTH CARE].
169 See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: SERVICES & PROJECTS,
at http: /lwww.mahealthdata.org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/DocumentsOfferings (last visited
Mar. 21, 2002) (noting standard management reports on Insurer & Health Plan
Analysis, Hospital and Physician Analysis, Case Mix Profiles, Charge Analysis,
Market Share Analysis, Competitive Trend Analysis, Patient Origin by Town and
Hospital, Discharge Disposition by Town and Hospital) [hereinafter SERVICES &
PROJECTS].
170 See id. (noting the Inpatient Database, Medicaid Ambulatory Database,
Medicare Ambulatory Database, Ambulatory Surgery Database Project, Physician
Licensure Database).
171 MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: MEMBER LISTINGS, at http:
I/www.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsflDocumentslMembers (last visited Mar. 21,
2002).
172 20 YEARS IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 168.
173 See SERVICES & PROJECTS, supra note 169 (noting the Inpatient Database,
Medicaid Ambulatory Database, Medicare Ambulatory Database, Ambulatory Sur-
gery Database Project, Physician Licensure Database).
174 See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM: INPATIENT DATABASE,
at http://www.mahealthdata.orglmhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9
fd/eaaafe2fb4ceOf77862565afOO55ec5l?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
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predominant number of uses for these competitive market com-
parison purposes. 175 It is questionable whether, without this mu-
tual competitive benefit, the Consortium would exist. Moreover,
as will be seen in the example of Cleveland Health Quality
Choice, the long-term viability of the Consortium may also be
questionable should the New England market consolidate into
fewer IDSs and MCOs.
The Consortium, through its AHINNE initiative, has been
leading an effort to establish a regional information infrastruc-
ture among participating providers and MCOs. 176 The group an-
nounced in 1996 efforts to create this network, including elec-
tronic access to medical records among its constituency. 177 AH-
INNE rejected the concept of "[riegional centralized data re-
positories," promoting, instead, initiatives to build "'virtual'
network[s]" among key stakeholders in the New England mar-
ket.178 A consolidated clinical repository has been described as
"costly, difficult to implement, and impractical for such a wide
variety of data sources."'179 Further a centralized data repository
of more comprehensive medical records has been presented as a
greater threat to confidentiality of medical records than busi-
ness-to-business integration.180
AHINNE's networking initiatives have been driven by op-
erational data sharing needs, primarily between providers and
payors, automating business to business needs (i.e., electronic
data interchange of claims information)'81 rather than more far
(noting the data elements and reporting available from the inpatient database; nota-
bly, cost information is not available and the orientation of standard reports is toward
hospital planning: market share, market share trends, patient origination, and clinical
service trends within hospitals).
175 See MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH DATA CONSORTIUM, OUR CLIENTS TELL THE
STORY (noting a "summary" of 1999 data requests revealing that of eleven listed,
nine are for competitive market positioning of services), http://www.mahealthdata.
org/mhdc/mhdc2.nsf/e214ac63ff65c87e852564580073a9fd/9817b442d9f7984386256
5b000686012?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).17 6 BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25.
177 See Eric Convey, Group Touts Medical Info Access, BOSTON HERALD,
Mar. 29, 1996, at B30.
17 8 BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25.
179 Id.
180 See also Convey, supra note 177 (noting the statement that it is easier to
protect patient confidentiality under a system of connected networks than a central
data repository).
181 Julie Jette, System to Standardize Medical Information, PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Mass), Mar. 31, 2000, at B6 (quoting Julia Cooney, an expert on the devel-
opment of the electronic transaction standards from Deloitte & Touche, noting that
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reaching networking of clinical records. At present, there seems
little initiative to develop an infrastructure to facilitate more
than transactional medical information sharing,1 82 and certainly
not the scope of longitudinal medical record sharing envisioned
in this Note.
Cleveland Health Quality Choice began in 1989 by a group
of the region's largest employers. 83 Participants included the
Greater Cleveland Hospital Association, the Academy of Medi-
cine and the Health Action Council of Northeastern Ohio, 184 the
spearheading organization of the quality reporting initiative
now representing fifteen major employers and the Council of
Smaller Enterprises (COSE). COSE brought an additional 700
smaller businesses to group. In 1996 the groups represented
more than 350,000 employees and dependants. 85
Cleveland Health Quality Choice was created in order to
identify and implement a "common set" of quality measure-
ments of market hospitals and health systems.18 The group cre-
ated the quality measuring through work with physicians and
statisticians, with the objective of comparing likely and actual
outcomes, using elements such as "mortality, patient satisfac-
tion and length of stay,"'187 controlling for severity of illness. 188
The employer groups have utilized the data to negotiate bulk
contracts with higher quality facilities in certain specialties, de-
creasing costs to members.1 89
business-to-business e-commerce as mandated in government regulations is the driv-
ing force behind AHINNE pilot program networking).
182 See BRETAGNE ET AL., supra note 25 (noting as the only substantive initia-
tive underway an effort to use secured email to share patient medical information).
183 Christopher Dauer, Nestle Exec Raps U.S. Health System, NAT. UNDER-
wRrr ER Mar. 18, 1991, at 21, 28.
1I4 id.
185 See Grant Segall, Doctoring the Way We Rate Hospitals, PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 16, 1996, at B1.
186 Dauer, supra note 183, at 28.
187 Segall, supra note 185, at B1.
188 See Joan M. Mazzolini, Hospital Review Set for Release, PLAIN DEALER,
Mar.18, 1993, at BI (noting severity adjustments); see also Segall, supra note 185, at
B 1 (noting that despite criticisms concerning effectiveness of measurements, outside
experts have reviewed the rating system finding it 'about the best that have been done
anywhere').
189 See Joan Mazzolini, Area Businesses to Give Hospital Contracts Based on
Performance, PLAIN DEALER, May 17, 1996, at Al (stating that the contracts went "to
hospitals that have received good marks on report cards rating quality of care").
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The efforts by the Cleveland Health Quality Choice, how-
ever, had been strongly criticized by participating health sys-
tems as early as 1993.190 The Cleveland Clinic Foundation, one
of the Cleveland institutions developing IDSs, increasingly at-
tacked the program, calling for a complete overhaul. 191 As the
Cleveland health care market began consolidating under in-
creasing competitive and pricing pressures, commentators noted
that the Cleveland Health Quality Choice reporting played an
important role in ensuring quality of care.192 Nonetheless,
considerable criticism of the Cleveland Health Quality Choice
and the Health Action Council's use of its data in designating
Centers of Excellence for employer contracting continued
through the mid to late 1990s. 193
By the late 1990s, two IDSs had emerged in the Cleveland
health care market-University Hospitals Health System of
Cleveland and the Cleveland Clinic Health System.194 Other
budding IDSs either left the market, in the case of Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp. (after its failed attempt to acquire
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ohio), 195 or went bankrupt, as did the
Physician Health Systems network. 196 Although the effective-
ness of the Cleveland Health Quality Choice program in realiz-
ing true savings for its participants may be questioned, 197 many
considered it to have increased quality in the Cleveland market.
190 See Mazzolini, supra note 188, at B1 (noting the Cleveland Clinic Founda-
tion and University Hospitals of Cleveland were most critical of the reporting and
that the Cleveland Clinic Foundation might withdraw); see also Segall, supra note
196, at BI (accusing Quality Choice of mismeasuring risks and outcomes).
191 Segall, supra note 185, at 1; see also Raquel Santiago, Mixon Hits
Hospital Rating Program, CRAiN'S CLEVELAND BusINESS, May 19, 1997, at 3
(discussing Cleveland Clinic director Malachi Mixon's criticism of the project for
inaccuracy and expense).
192 See Joan Mazzolini, Hospital Grade Card Effort Wants Larger Role,
PLAIN DEALER, May 25, 1995, at B 1 (noting how "having someone looking at quality
helps keep everyone from the great temptation of cutting back too far").
19 See Joan Mazzolini, Hospitals Rebel at Quality Ratings, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 9, 1997, at 1; Raquel Santiago, Hospitals Assail Designation System, CRAIN'S
CLEVELAND Bus., Oct. 13, 1997, at 3.
194 Diane Solov, Building Health-Care Empires, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 16,
1997, at Hi.
195 Diane Solov, Survival Of Strongest Proves Operative Rule for Hospitals,
PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 9, 2000, at Al.
196 See Regina McEnery & Diane Solov, Amid New Efforts to Save Hospitals,
Court Clears Way to a Shutdown, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
197 Troy Flint, Health Program's Goal Difficult To Achieve, PLAIN DEALER, February
26, 1999, at 1C.
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The market consolidation, nonetheless, made it possible for
Cleveland Clinic Health System to pull out of the program with
its system hospitals. 198 The Cleveland Health Quality Choice
program was "snuffed out" by this action. 199 Later, when the
Health Action Council attempted to develop a new quality
measurement program, the other major IDS, University Hospi-
tals Health System, followed the Cleveland Clinic Health Sys-
tem's lead and refused to participate. 00
As the Cleveland Health Quality Choice experience dem-
onstrates, the ability of larger Cleveland purchasers to provide
second-order exclusionary benefit to its health care consumers
has been largely frustrated as the market has consolidated. This
may be due to lack of bargaining power in the wake of increas-
ingly consolidated and powerful IDSs and the reciprocal inabil-
ity to contractually disgorge primary information from IDSs and
MCOs. The fact that an organization representing over 350,000
members would be unable to force IDSs to participate in quality
management studies is a staggering observation. Is external
monitoring of quality data simply irrelevant to health care deci-
sions as the Cleveland IDSs argue? The Health Action Council
does not think so, as evidenced by its continual effort to force
health care information data from the IDSs.
Due to these structural barriers, Sage has argued for a gov-
ernmental role in forcing the disclosure of health care quality
information by MCOs and IDSs, in order to support private de-
cisions2° 1 by individuals and, primarily, their expert agents. He
does, however, recognize the substantial barrier for the political
system working with health care industry stakeholders to de-
velop such a structure, absent a clear consensus on the primacy
of individual versus collective agency relationships,2 0 2 and
given the competitive issues discussed above. Although Sage
concludes his observation about these barrier on an optimistic
note, and suggests that the current ambiguities in agency rela-
198 See Joan Mazzolini, Clinic Drops Out of Hospital Report Card Program,
PLAiN DEALER, Jan. 9, 1999, at Al (discussing reasons for the Clinic pulling out).
199 Troy Flint, Hospital Program Snuffed Out, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 25, 1999,
at Cl.
200 See Sandra Livingston, Largest Hospitals Shunning Consumer Guide to
Health Care, PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 1999, at Cl.
201 Sage, supra note 25, at 1708-9.
202 See id. at 1756-57 (stating that for disclosure to be an effective tool to
improve health care, greater consensus regarding the obligations of the parties in-
volved will be required).
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tionships, in particular, may be simply transitional,2 3 he pro-
vides no final solution to this dilemma.
For our purposes, and at least as far as the use of secondary
health care information is concerned, the current health care
market may be structurally incapable of optimizing the inclu-
sionary/exclusionary benefits of this information without either
trampling on an individual's interests in her own medical in-
formation or unduly restricting secondary medical information
and its value. This disturbing possibility leads us to the final
section of this Note, discussing the possibility of a new player
in the health care information market-the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust.
PART IV: -EALTHCARE INFORMATION TRUST
Although a fictional organization, medical information
trusts have been proposed in a similar context previously-at
least as an abstract property categorization. Gottlieb has pro-
posed the trust as an optimum property model for the protection
of residual property interests of individuals in tissue samples
collected in tissue repositories.204 Gostin suggest that all holders
of health care information have a fiduciary responsibility to the
individuals to whom the information pertains, and are, there-
fore, 'health information trustees.'
20 5
The purpose of this part is to present a possible framework
for the Healthcare Information Trust, using the property concept
of a trust as guide, and discussing some of its potential advan-
tages and major barriers to its creation. The full scope of such a
proposed entity deserves more detailed attention than provided
in this final part. It is the author's hope that this Note will gen-
erate interest in fully exploring the possibilities of a Healthcare
Information Trust.
A. Healthcare Information Trust Structure
As its name suggests, the Healthcare Information Trust is a
legal trust that controls a person's individually identifiable
medical information for the benefit of the individual. The trust,
203 Id. at 1756.
204 Karen Gottlieb, Human Biological Samples and the Laws of Property: The
Trust as a Model for Biological Repositories, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 182 (Robert F. Wier ed., 1998).
205 Gostin, supra note 13, at 524-25.
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as a fiduciary agent, is assigned, by the individual, her property
interest in her health care information held by any provider,
health care plan or health care data clearinghouse. With the
emergence of IDS and MCO clinical data repositories and data
warehouses, the Trust could economically gain access to pre-
consolidated individually identifiable information through the
person's assignable right to copy her information. Practically,
the Healthcare Information Trust may link into the IDSs' or
MCOs' clinical data repositories or, if this is impractical, or re-
sisted, force the periodic transfer of this individually identifi-
able medical and transactional information into the Healthcare
Information Trust's own data repository. Although records will
remain with the IDS or MCO for their own "primary" data use
for the direct benefit of the individual's episode of care and for
health care financial transactions, the Healthcare Information
Trust, alone, would have the necessary waiver from the individ-
ual to use the data for "secondary" purposes. The creation of a
Healthcare Information Trust recognizes that the current market
is inadequate to realize protection for individuals in the secon-
dary use of their health care information for purposes that pro-
vide them inclusionary benefit and second-order exclusionary
benefits, while still protecting individuals from adverse first-
order exclusionary uses.
Trust relationships are frequent in health care where an
agent is needed to provide expert assistance. For example, the
basics of the physician-patient relationship are felt, by some
courts and commentators to incorporate the concept of fiduciary
trust.206 Other types of trust, such as those embodied in ERISA
plans already discussed, are also examples.20 7 These relation-
ships arise in situations where a potential trust beneficiary
would benefit by an expert agent, who, due to the experts capa-
bilities and asymmetrical knowledge, can achieve a benefit for
the beneficiary that the beneficiary might be unable to achieve
alone. Further, fiduciary law, inherent in trustee-beneficiary re-
lationships, has evolved recognizing that more vulnerable par-
206 See Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 532 N.E.2d 327, 331
(Ill. 1988) (disagreeing with other jurisdictions that allow ex parte communications
between a treating physician and his patient's legal adversary); Alexander v. Knight,
177 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1962) (finding that doctor breached his fiduciary duty to his pa-
tient when he induced another doctor to breach a confidential relationship with that
patient).207 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1744.
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ties (beneficiaries) need to be protected from the more powerful
agent.2 °8
The concept of fiduciary is central to the concept of a
Healthcare Information Trust and is its major advantage over
other market players that might play this role. The trustee, when
assigned the assets of the trust (i.e., individually identifiable
healthcare information) would be obligated to make the trust
property productive for the benefit of the trust beneficiary. 20 9
The trustee's obligation, unlike IDSs or MCOs who may be sub-
ject to a variety of competing interests, is oriented only toward
the interests of the beneficiary.
A trust, as a legal creation, is not difficult to implement. It
can be created by the express intent of the settlor to establish it,
and requires no special process or writing, so long as the pur-
poses of the trust are adequately described in the trust agree-
ment.2 10 The settlor of the trust must have an ownership interest
in the trust asset,211 which would be satisfied by most state laws
recognizing ownership in the information within medical re-
cords212 and by the HHS regulations.213
208 Gottlieb, supra note 204, at 193.
2)9 AusTiN W. ScoTr & WLLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 181
(4th ed. 1987).2 10 Id. § 17.1.
211 Id.§ 75.
212 Paul V. Stearns, Access to and Cost of Reproduction of Patient Medical
Records: A Comparison of State Laws, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 79 (2000) (tracing the evo-
lution of common law and statutory property rights of patients in their medical re-
cords). The author concludes that the popular view has become that "[w]hen patients
pay for treatment, whether directly, through health insurance, or via taxes for some
type of subsidized care, they pay not only for diagnosis and treatment but also for
information [thus, forming a property right in this information]." Id. at 104.
213 Although not calling it a property right, per se, HHS noted in its proposed
rule certain rights that patients may exercise, which have been maintained in the final
rule:
We are proposing to establish several basic rights for individuals with
respect to their protected health information. We propose that individuals
be able to obtain access to protected health information about them, which
would include a right to inspect and obtain a copy of such information....
The right of access would extend to an accounting of disclosures of the
protected health information for purposes other than treatment, payment,
and health care operations.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,917, 59,926 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999).
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A critical issue for the Healthcare Information Trust would
be its ability to financially sustain itself after initial funding. At
this point, a mature market for secondary health care informa-
tion has not yet been realized, despite evidence of secondary
health care information use for a variety of commercial uses.
Nonetheless, it may be possible for the Healthcare Information
Trust to create a secondary health care market sufficient to fund
its operations.
The HHS Final Standards for Privacy do not explicitly
contemplate an organization such as the Healthcare Information
Trust. Nonetheless, under the HHS regulations, information
concerning individuals may be assigned to third parties, such as
IDSs or MCOs, for secondary use purposes. This implies that an
individual may assign her rights, not to an MCO, IDS or other
existing health care organization, but to the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust. Once assigned, the information would be usable by
the Trust for any purposes specified in the trust agreement,
which would incorporate the waiver provisions required by the
HHS Final Standards for Privacy. Since secondary uses of
health care information by MCOs, IDSs, and other health care
organizations is prohibited except with explicit authorization by
the individual (and except as allowed in restricted circum-
stances by the final rule), such a trust agreement would provide
the Healthcare Information Trust a virtual monopoly over its
beneficiary population's information-a commodity that may
become extremely valuable.
The structure also has the benefit that it can allow the
Healthcare Information Trust, or its licensed agents, to act as an
intermediary that can unlock the inclusionary and second-order
exclusionary benefits of the data for the consumer, or the con-
sumer's health care, or insurance purchasing agents. This is best
described through example whereby pharmaceutical information
would be "marketed" to trust beneficiaries.
First, the Healthcare Information Trust would allow indi-
vidual beneficiaries the ability to choose the level of communi-
cation they wish from pharmaceutical companies. Based upon
beneficiaries' individual and collective willingness to accept
communications, the Healthcare Information Trust could offer a
menu of demographic information to interested pharmaceutical
companies interested in a precisely targeted population. The
pharmaceutical firm might then identify its "target demo-
graphic," selecting from possibly hundreds of characteristics the
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Healthcare Information Trust tracks, and pay the Trust for the
privilege of marketing to its selected group through the Health-
care Information Trust. In this manner, no individually identifi-
able information-in fact, not even aggregated information-is
passed to the pharmaceutical company. In such a model, the
consumer benefits from access to inclusionary benefits, but in-
dividually identifiable health care information is safeguarded by
the Trustee. Facilitated communication replaces the concern of
"privacy" of information in the Healthcare Information Trust.
This, of course, raises several questions. First, why would
enterprises, such as pharmaceutical companies, wish to pur-
chase this type of access? Such "targeted marketing" efforts,
and the willingness of enterprises to focus their marketing dol-
lars on core customers, is not a completely novel concept. Far-
thinking marketing experts have begun to observe the materiali-
zation of what some call one-to-one 214  or "permission-
marketing." 215 They observe that, as more and more information
is collected on consumers, firms will have far greater ability to
identify their optimal customers and to target them for super-
216specialized goods and services. Others observe that the focus
on mass interruption marketing,21 7 such as television, radio,
billboard and other advertisements, will be increasingly aug-
mented by firms' efforts, once they have identified their core
customers, to customize marketing programs to much smaller,
homogeneous groups or even individuals -21 8 and establish a level
of two-way dialogue and trust with the customer.219 These or-
ganizations will then focus on gaining greater market share
214 See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76 (highlighting the one-to-one theory
behind consumer collaboration).
215 See generally GODIN, supra note 83, at 60-69 (discussing permission and
one-to-one marketing).
216 See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 3-7 (stating that the "old para-
digm, a system of mass production, mass media, and mass marketing, is being re-
placed by a totally new paradigm, a one-to-one economic system").
217 See id. at 10 (calling it "awareness" advertising or "mass media"); see also
GODiN, supra note 83, at 53-56 (discussing history of interruption marketing).
218 See GODIN, supra note 83, at 64 (discussing techniques to turn customers
into "supercustomers"); see also PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 10 (noting that
1:1 media are individually addressable).
219 See GODIN, supra note 83, at 79-96 (discussing how frequency builds
trust); PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 10-11, 51-94 (discussing the necessity of
a two way dialogue with customers and customer "collaboration" as a means to
facilitate this dialogue).
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from its core, most profitable, customers. 220 Godin argues that
in the future, dialogue with core customers will be an incredibly
valuable commodity.
2 21
Godin and Peppers & Rogers focus on the product-selling
firms as the organizer of this "permission marketing" and pro-
ducer-consumer "dialogue." This Note argues that due to the
sensitivity of health care information and the property right that
individuals have in their information, the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust might emerge as the facilitator of this interaction. In-
sofar as we are moving into a world in which firms will pay
substantial sums to develop a "dialogue" (i.e., for the privilege
of presenting product information and gathering information on
consumers), the Healthcare Information Trust could use this
market to sustain its administrative costs. Moreover, due to the
Standards of Privacy rules and the Healthcare Information
Trust's monopoly over its beneficiaries' data, these third parties
would be forced to use the Healthcare Information Trust as an
intermediary, or entirely forgo a truly "1:1 dialogue" with that
population.
The Healthcare Information Trust could also be a superior
investment vehicle for government in promoting population dis-
ease management and medical records research. Bowser and
Gostin argue that "well considered delegations, incentives and
regulations" might create partnerships between government and
MCOs to promote "public health"222 since MCOs are emerging
as the key holders of health care information.2 3 The authors
contend that regulatory governmental intervention is best to
solve such a problem and to focus investment in cross-
competitor market initiatives to provide inclusionary and sec-
ond-order exclusionary benefits to consumers. 2 4 Bowser and
Gostin go so far as to suggest seed money for their initiatives,
supposing support similar to the HMO Act of 1973.25
The Healthcare Information Trust could be, however, at
least a comparable solution in promotion of inclusionary bene-
220 See PEPPERS & ROGERS, supra note 76, at 18-19, 123 (describing the logis-
tics of applying the one-to-one theory to customer market).21 GODIN, supra note 83, at 74-78, 94-96, 131-42.
222 Bowser & Gostin, supra note 154, at 1214.
223 See id. at 1280 (discussing MCO development of comprehensive patient
records).
224 See id. at 1281.
225 Id. at 1281-82.
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fits (e.g., screening notices, collective management of diseases
such as asthma in broader populations) as well as second-order
exclusionary benefits (e.g., whole population HEDIS reporting).
In fact, the government might be a primary purchaser of infor-
mation from the Trust for government-funded clinical research,
public health research, and to coordinate government-initiated
inclusionary benefit initiatives for target populations. Moreover,
the Healthcare Information Trust would far more effectively
consolidate resources by providing a central repository of medi-
cal information, collection of which is occurring now on an in-
dividual, ad hoc, and highly inefficient basis. Much of the data
used in federally funded clinical research is already collected in
medical records,226 but is difficult, extremely costly, or even
Impossible to access because of its location across the islands of
data discussed in this Note. By refocusing resources on consoli-
dation of primary sources through a Healthcare Information
Trusts, duplication of efforts may be avoided.
Finally, the Healthcare Information Trust would also be far
more responsive to market pressures than government-industry
partnerships. The second order exclusionary information re-
ported from the Healthcare Information Trust, or its expert
agents, would be, ostensibly, the information most desired by
individuals and their expert purchasers, rather than those se-
lected by a political process subject to timing delays and to cap-
ture by special interests.227 Therefore, this Note suggests that
the government should explore investment in Healthcare Infor-
mation Trusts if "seed money" becomes available, opening fur-
ther funding options for the entity.
The second question is what benefit would such a trust ar-
rangement have for consumers? First, beneficiaries might have
direct financial returns once a mature secondary health care
market emerges. Insofar as the revenue received by selling ac-
cess to this information exceeds administrative costs, a premium
or annuity might be paid to beneficiaries based upon the degree
to which they allow themselves to be communicated with. Al-
though this might not be a large sum and its availability is con-
jectural-it is an incentive that should not be ignored.
226 Gostin, supra note 13, at 457.
227 See Sage, supra note 25, at 1708-09 (arguing for a political disclosure
regime, but identifying major political process barriers).
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Second, many individuals welcome beneficial, tailored
marketing information. This may be particularly so if the infor-
mation is relevant to a specific need, such as specialized health
care services. Murphy noted a series of privacy studies con-
.• 228
ducted by Equifax, a credit reporting organization. He com-
mented on a study concerning consumer perceptions of direct
marketing. When questions were biased toward the harms of
direct solicitation, the majority of responses perceived direct
marketing disfavorably. 229 However, when question bias was
toward the potential benefits of direct marketing, the majority
perceived direct marketing favorably. 230 Murphy validly ob-
serves that a minority, in either case, has a strong preference for
privacy, notwithstanding benefits of direct marketing. 231 How-
ever, the study directly demonstrates that all individuals do not
unequivocally reject such marketing.
The Healthcare Information Trust, or its expert agents
might also provide other, non-commercial inclusionary benefits
and second-order exclusionary benefits. The Virginia Electronic
Medical Record demonstrates the power of this information to
be used over the Internet. This has the advantage of providing
an immediate, tangible, and demonstrable product to the indi-
vidual. That is, the individual would have full access to a true
"longitudinal medical record" for her own individual use. Fur-
ther, to the extent that she uses health care providers from mul-
tiple IDSs or has transferred between different MCOs, her full
record would be available to those outside of the particular IDS
or MCO. In addition, she, and her expert agent, would be able
to control the level and content of health care information dis-
closed. It should again be noted that this information would in
no way replace the clinical and transactional information sys-
tems used by individual providers, IDSs, and MCOs; however,
greater access to information in an Internet-based medical re-
cord system-particularly where a full longitudinal medical re-
cord would not be available across competing IDSs and compet-
ing unaligned providers-can substantially benefit care deliv-
ery. Some level of this benefit would likely be provided gratui-
tously, as the Healthcare Information Trust would need such a
228 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 2404-07.
229 See id. at 2405.
230 See id. at 2405-06.
23 See id. at 2406.
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real service product immediately to appeal to interested con-
sumers as an incentive to sign the trust agreement.
Ultimately, the initial direct financial and inclusionary
benefits to individuals will likely be dwarfed by the positive
economies of scale created once the Healthcare Information
Trust garners a large population. That is to say, that since the
value of the information product offered to third parties (e.g.,
pharmaceutical companies or governmental agencies), or analy-
sis of health care records (e.g., population IIEDIS measures or
provider proofing) will be in direct relation to the size of the
beneficiary population managed by the Healthcare Information
Trust, a critical mass of beneficiaries will be needed before
Healthcare Information Trust is truly marketable. Therefore, the
cost of initially organizing a critical mass of individual benefi-
ciaries may be a substantial hurdle-if not prohibitive.
The Healthcare Information Trust would best be marketed
through other organizations, such as employers, employer coali-
tions, and other entities (e.g., American Association of Retired
Persons) representing large pools of health care consumers.
These organizations would be in the best position to understand
and value the second-order exclusionary benefits that such an
organization might offer. For example, in Cleveland, there are
over 350,000 potential beneficiaries in the defunct Cleveland
Health Quality Choice program whose expert purchasers are
still looking for a mechanism to provide these benefits to its
membership. Although this would not eliminate subscription
costs, it might make them manageable. This topic will be dis-
cussed further in the next section of this Note.
Considering the competitive and agency problems inherent
in industry collaborations, most acutely demonstrated by the
Cleveland Health Quality Choice experience, it is questionable
whether more than business-to-business integration of medical
health information will ever occur absent some other configura-
tion such as the Healthcare Information Trust. There are, none-
theless, substantial barriers to the creation of a Healthcare In-
formation Trust.
B. The Healthcare Information Trust's Most Substantial
Barriers
There are significant barriers to the Healthcare Information
Trust emerging as a viable entity. This Note will address the
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most challenging. Problems related to initial capitalization, on-
going funding, consumer indifference, and strong resistance by
vested health care industry interests are the most serious.
The Healthcare Information Trust becomes independently
financially viable only when it can achieve a critical mass of
beneficiaries and promote its services in a mature secondary
information market, with organizations willing to purchase ac-
cess to its data or analysis. In a circular dilemma, a critical mass
of beneficiaries is needed to develop its market; but to be finan-
cially viable and able to draw a critical mass of beneficiaries, it
needs a more mature secondary information market in which to
operate. The Healthcare Information Trust, therefore, needs to
be funded in order to create an infrastructure, draw beneficiar-
ies, and develop the secondary health care information market.
This funding could be substantial.
Absent governmental intervention, large health care pur-
chasers, such as self-funded employer groups and employer
purchasing coalitions, must embrace this concept. Ideally,
Medicare and State Medicaid programs would also follow suit,
if the commercially oriented initiatives were successful. Larger
purchasers, despite their own agency conflicts, might even per-
ceive value in the Healthcare Information Trust model and pro-
vide seed funding and, most critically, a conduit through which
the Healthcare Information Trust could promote its services di-
rectly to individuals. In fact, as the Cleveland Health Quality
Choice experience described in the previous part of this Note
demonstrates, it may be the only way to disgorge information
from MCOs and IDSs without governmental regulatory action.
To maximize the benefit of whole population inclusion,
similar to the HDO concept of "inclusiveness," within Health-
care Information Trusts,23 2 the government may also play a role
in licensing. Looking to the utility industries as an example, an
individual Healthcare Information Trust might be afforded a
service monopoly over one or several market areas. This would
have the advantage of ensuring one consolidated and uniform
provider of this information within a geographic region, enhanc-
ing the value of secondary information reporting and inclusion-
ary and exclusionary benefits to individuals and expert health
care purchasers. Further, it might accelerate the development of
the secondary health care market and provide, through monop-
232 See INST. OFMED., supra note 17, at 5.
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oly pricing benefit, an enhanced return to beneficiaries and
management company partners.
Consumer indifference may also be a substantial barrier.
The same indifference that leads patients to undervalue their
health care information in provider settings might make it diffi-
cult to effectively communicate the benefits of the Healthcare
Information Trust. This might be partially offset by substantive
large-purchaser partnerships with Healthcare Information
Trusts. It may also be partially offset by the inclusionary bene-
fits offered, particularly in early stages prior to the availability
of dividend payments. Such a consumer barrier may make it
expensive to educate populations about the benefits of such an
arrangement and add to the funding needed to form the Health-
care Information Trust.
Since it is likely that a Healthcare Information Trust would
need to be a non-profit organization "owned" by its beneficiar-
ies, direct profit-sharing ownership in the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust would be limited. Nonetheless, the for-profit trust
managers may be willing to provide funding, in hopes of long-
term fund management contracts and other opportunities (e.g.,
using non-identifiable data for reporting or preferred "market-
ing arrangements" using the Healthcare Information Trust as
intermediary). IDSs or MCOs, through third party administra-
tors or other subsidiary management companies, might even
realize the Healthcare Information Trust concept is in their own
best long-term interest and offer such partnerships. This might
occur after the Healthcare Information Trust has established a
foothold. These relationships would, of course, be subject to the
Healthcare Information Trust's primary fiduciary obligations to
its beneficiaries.
An empirical analysis of the potential financial market in
which a Healthcare Information Trust operates is outside the
scope of this Note. It is recognized that, absent ongoing gov-
ernmental subsidies, the feasibility of the Healthcare Informa-
tion Trust depends upon this determination.
Finally, the resistance of current health care market con-
stituencies to the Healthcare Information Trust cannot be under-
estimated. Although IDSs and MCOs may present a variety of
barriers to the emergence of Healthcare Information Trusts, in-
cluding political roadblocks, mere access to electronic medical
records may be the largest single barrier that the Healthcare In-
formation Trust might face.
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HEALTH MATRIX
Although the HHS regulations mandate individual access to
"copies" of medical information, the regulations do not explic-
itly contemplate the type of electronic access required by the
Healthcare Information Trust. The final privacy rule leaves such
a transfer open, however. It states that the "covered entity must
provide the individual with access to the protected health in-
formation in the form or format requested by the individual, if it
is readily producible in such form or format; or, if not, in a
readable hard copy form" or as agreed by the covered entity and
the individual.23 3 On the other hand, access only to paper copies
of medical records and claims data would undoubtedly raise the
transaction costs for a Healthcare Information Trust to an un-
manageable level. Moreover, access to or transfer of electronic
information in clinical data repositories or data warehouses in
electronic format will require a substantial degree of technical
collaboration between the Healthcare Information Trust and the
target IDSs and MCOs. Even if provided financial compensa-
tion for such collaboration, it is not likely that MCOs and IDSs
would work with Healthcare Information Trusts voluntarily.
Moreover, even if MCOs and IDSs provide access to electronic
data, they may well be inclined to frustrate Healthcare Informa-
tion Trusts by imposing unreasonably "copying" charges, mak-
ing electronic record transfers financially infeasible.234
The problem of industry reluctance, therefore, may also re-
quire some degree of governmental or health purchaser inter-
vention. Judicial precedent giving an individual access to medi-
cal records in electronic format may achieve this. More likely,
legislative or regulatory mandates might be required. Achieving
these goals might also require substantial leverage by large
health care purchasers with a vested interest in making the
Healthcare Information Trust a reality. Again, business coali-
tions, such as Cleveland's Health Action Council, which estab-
lished the now defunct Cleveland Health Quality Choice, might
be viable partners. Health Action Council's experience may also
233 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(2)(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
234 One author tracks the use of copying charges as a means to frustrate ac-
cess: [Alt Kinko's, a nationally recognized copy business, the charge for copying is
approximately $ .07 per page, which includes the businesses' staff making the copies.
... [A typical] hospital's price per copy .... $ .83 per page .... seems patently un-
reasonable. Steams, supra note 212, at 80 (discussing the mixed results of case law
interpreting statutes requiring "reasonable" copying charges for medical records).
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suggest that even larger purchasers will not have the leverage to
force this collaboration without governmental intervention.
CONCLUSION
This Note has differentiated between primary and secon-
dary health care information use, recognizing the emerging
value of secondary health care information compiled in health-
care delivery and financing transactions. This Note has also pre-
sented IDSs and MCOs as the primary organizers of health care
information and recognized the increasing consolidation of in-
formation within clinical data repositories and data warehouses.
Further, it suggests, through a discussion of medical record
economics in light of imminent "privacy default rules," com-
petitive and agency problems in health care, and actual experi-
ence of MCOs and IDSs, that existing organizations are not ca-
pable of fully exploiting secondary health care information for
the benefit of individuals.
This Note also recognizes that the IHHS Final Standards for
Privacy provide an individual with an affirmative "property"
right in her medical records. Through this property interest an
individual may fully restrict her information from all but ex-
cluded or waived secondary uses. The individual might assign
her rights to another entity, however, such as the Healthcare In-
formation Trust.
This Note suggests that a Healthcare Information Trust
could emerge as the expert agent for an individual's secondary
health care information. As an entity with an unfettered fiduci-
ary obligation to maximize the benefit of secondary health care
information for the individual, it would be situated outside of
MCO and IDS competitive and agency limitations. Due to the
Healthcare Information Trust's unique ability to coordinate al-
ready consolidated health care information, its virtual monopoly
over secondary use of health care data, its ability to ensure only
limited disclosure of information, and its ability to use secon-
dary health care information for the full range of inclusionary
and second-order exclusionary purposes for the Healthcare In-
formation Trust's beneficiaries, it is a compelling vision. None-
theless, barriers are apparent. Economic, practical, and political
barriers still need to be fully explored and overcome should the
vision be realized.
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